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Introduction 
As of 2017, about 1,330,000 inmates are housed in state prisons in 
the U.S.1 These inmates represent approximately 60 percent of the al-
most 2.3 million persons confined by various jurisdictions in the United 
States.2 
California, Florida, and Texas are the three states with the highest 
prison population in absolute numbers, accounting for more than one-
third of all state prisoners as of 2017.3 As of 2016, the District of Colum-
bia had the highest per-capita incarceration rate in the U.S.—with 
1,196 inmates per 100,000 residents—followed closely by Louisiana.4 
 
1. Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The 
Whole Pie 2017, at 1 (2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/factsheets/ 
pie2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9PV-8JMV]. 
2. See id. 
3. See California Profile, Prison Pol’y Initiative, https://www. 
prisonpolicy.org/profiles/CA.html [https://perma.cc/6CSY-93W3] (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2017) (reporting that California had 242,000 individuals 
incarcerated in 2016); Florida Profile, Prison Pol’y Initiative, 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/FL.html [https://perma.cc/6THT-
8A25] (last visited Oct. 10, 2017) (reporting that Florida had 177,000 
incarcerated individuals in 2016); Texas Profile, Prison Pol’y Initiative, 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/TX.html [https://perma.cc/QVG2-
VUUA] (last visited Oct. 10, 2017) (reporting that Texas had 246,000 
incarcerated individuals in 2016). 
4. Peter Wagner & Alison Walsh, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 
2016, Prison Pol’y Initiative (June 16, 2016), https://www. 
prisonpolicy.org/global/2016.html [[https://perma.cc/JHZ8-8WHV]. The 
District of Columbia rate is only slightly higher than that in Louisiana—
1,143 inmates per 100,000 residents. Id. The average rate in the U.S. as a 
whole is 693 inmates per 100,000 residents. Id. For a global perspective, the 
imprisonment rate in Japan is 47 per 100,000 and that of Brazil is 307 per 
100,000, which is lower than that of the state with the lowest incarceration 
rate in the U.S., Massachusetts—330 per 100,000. Id. 
 5. Even with the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) in place, access to healthcare 
in the U.S. remains a challenge. Donald A. Barr, Introduction to US 
Health Policy: The Organization, Financing, and Delivery of 
Health Care in America 330–54 (4th ed. 2016). What is more, the future 
of the ACA remains uncertain. This is, in part, because of a 2014 federal 
lawsuit brought by the U.S. House of Representatives against the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 
185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 174–75 (D.D.C.), appeal held in abeyance, 676 F. 
App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that, while Congress authorized reduced 
cost sharings under the ACA to reimburse insurers for charging certain 
beneficiaries reduced “out-of-pocket” rates, Congress never appropriated 
any funds for it, making any such reimbursements by the Secretary 
unconstitutional). While the Obama Administration was engaged in 
defending the payments at issue on appeal, the approach of the current 
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The U.S. as a whole is struggling to provide reliable access to 
effective and affordable healthcare.5 Moreover, inmates are sicker on av-
erage than the general population.6 
A little over forty years ago, the Supreme Court decided Estelle v. 
Gamble,7 a landmark decision concerning the constitutional standard 
for medical care behind bars. Since Estelle, most litigation8 and much 
academic commentary9 on prison healthcare has focused on the Eighth 
Amendment. 
This Comment sets out to update older studies from around 1970 
that devoted a fair deal of attention to prison healthcare under then-
 
 Congress and Administration is less than certain as of this writing. House 
of Representatives v. Price, Health Reform Tracker, http://www. 
healthreformtracker.org/house-of-representatives-v-price/ [https://perma. 
cc/82DW-HBJD] (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). Moreover, for the months 
following Dec. 31, 2018, the ACA’s “shared responsibility payment” for 
those failing to maintain minimum essential coverage, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c) 
(2012)—commonly known as the “individual mandate”—was eliminated by 
the tax bill signed into law by the President on Dec. 22, 2017. Act of Dec. 
22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054, 2093 (to be codified 
at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)); see Margot Sanger-Katz, Requiem for the 
Individual Mandate, N.Y. Times (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/12/21/upshot/individual-health-insurance-mandate-end 
-impact.html [https://perma.cc/C9A3-7N6R] (discussing the brief history 
of the individual mandate and the potential impact of its repeal on 
healthcare markets). 
6. See 1 Michael B. Mushlin, Rights of Prisoners § 4:1 (4th ed. 2016) 
(summarizing recent health statistics concerning prisoners). 
7. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
8. 1 Mushlin, supra note 6, § 4:1 (noting that, “[d]espite the availability of 
other approaches [on the state and federal levels], virtually all of the 
litigation in [the area of inmate medical care] is based on federal 
constitutional grounds, specifically the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments”). 
9. E.g., Evelyn Malavé, Note, Prison Health Care After the Affordable Care 
Act: Envisioning an End to the Policy of Neglect, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 700 
(2014); Douglas C. McDonald, Medical Care in Prisons, 26 Crime & Just. 
427 (1999); Damon Martin, Comment, State Prisoners’ Rights to Medical 
Treatment: Merely Elusive or Wholly Illusory, 8 Black L.J. 427 (1983); 
Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to 
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 Yale L.J. 506 (1963) [hereinafter 
Beyond the Ken of the Courts]; Note, Prisoners’ Remedies for 
Mistreatment, 59 Yale L.J. 800 (1950). 
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existing state law10 by exploring some aspects of how the provision of 
healthcare in state prisons is regulated and litigated at the state level 
today.11 To achieve this goal, this Comment proceeds in two parts. Part 
I discusses various models for state regulation of healthcare in prisons. 
Part I places special emphasis on the managed-care model. The imple-
mentation of this model is discussed based on the example of Con-
necticut. Managed care has held out the promise of quality affordable 
care, but has also generated some controversy over the past decades as 
inimical to quality healthcare. Part II highlights a number of aspects of 
litigating healthcare claims by prisoners by discussing the torts and 
medical malpractice approach to healthcare litigation under state law. 
The Conclusion will summarize the findings of Parts I and II and offer 
some proposals for reform. 
I. Regulating Prison Healthcare 
A. The General Context: State Constitutions, Laws, and Regulations 
States have regulated the provision of healthcare to their prisoners 
beginning in the eighteenth century. For instance, Delaware’s 1792 
Constitution appears to be the first state constitution to do so by 
requiring that “in the construction of [jails] a proper regard shall be had 
to the health of prisoners.”12 In the years following the Civil War, other 
 
10. For a detailed discussion of state law regarding medical care for inmates 
circa 1970, see Michael H. Slutsky, Comment, The Rights of Prisoners to 
Medical Care and the Implications for Drug-Dependent Prisoners and 
Pretrial Detainees, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 705, 706–11 (1975); Marvin Zalman, 
Prisoners’ Rights to Medical Care, 63 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 185, 
186–90 (1972); and Barney Sneidman, Prisoners and Medical Treatment: 
Their Rights and Remedies, 4 Crim. L. Bull. 450, 451–56 (1968). For a 
summary glance at state law in this regard, see Martin, supra note 9, at 
427–28; Beyond the Ken of the Courts, supra note 9, at 507–09 (noting that 
available legal remedies, including civil rights and tort law, were blunted at 
the time by “a conviction held with virtual unanimity by the courts that it 
is beyond their power to review the internal management of the prison 
system”); Prisoners’ Remedies for Mistreatment, supra note 9, at 801 
(discussing inadequate remedies for prison disciplinary abuse). 
11. The familiar statement by Justice Brandeis concerning states as 
“laboratories” underlies this focus on the states: “[i]t is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
12. Del. Const. of 1792, art. I, § 11. 
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states—North Carolina,13 Tennessee,14 Wyoming,15 and Georgia16—
turned the condition of their prisons, including the health and general 
treatment of their prisoners, into concerns of constitutional magnitude. 
 
13. The 1868 Constitution of North Carolina appears to be the first state 
constitution mandating humane treatment of prisoners after Delaware’s. 
N.C. Const. of 1868, art. XI, § 6 (“It shall be required by competent 
legislation, that the structure and superintendence of penal institutions of 
the State . . . secure the health and comfort of the prisoners . . . .”). After 
all, in keeping with the ideas of the prison-reform movement of the 1860s, 
imprisonment served “to reform the offender” to prevent crime, “not just 
to satisfy justice.” Id. art. XI, § 2. See, e.g., E.C. Wines & Theodore W. 
Dwight, Report on the Prisons and Reformatories of the United 
States and Canada Made to the Legislature of New York, 
January, 1867, at 144–46 (1867) (noting that “the humane system [of 
prison discipline] . . . is more effective . . . in promoting [the inmates’] 
reformation, than the system of harshness and severity” and rooting in the 
Bible its model of a prison disciplinary system that meets out 
“[p]unishment . . . with reformation for its end and kindness as the means”). 
Article XI was completely rewritten when the state adopted its current, 
1971 Constitution. See generally John V. Orth, The North Carolina 
State Constitution 32–37 (2d ed. 2011) (outlining some major 
developments in the state’s constitutional history between 1796 and the 
1970s); Report of the North Carolina State Constitution Study 
Commission 88–89 (1968) (stating that the 1868 provisions had “served 
their intended purpose or are so detailed as to be more appropriate for 
statutory than for constitutional treatment” and giving the state legislature 
the responsibility “to provide appropriate institutions and agencies to 
minister to the . . . correctional needs of the State”); infra note 21. 
14. In 1870, Tennessee added language to its constitution to mandate “safe and 
comfortable prisons.” Tenn. Const. of 1870, art. I, § 32. See Robert W. 
Lough, Comment, Tennessee Constitutional Standards for Conditions of 
Pretrial Detention: A Mandate for Jail Reform, 48 Tenn. L. Rev. 688, 
705–06 (1981) (discussing the scarce legislative history of this provision). 
The Tennessee Constitution currently requires that “the erection of safe 
prisons, the inspection of prisons, and the humane treatment of prisoners, 
shall be provided for.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 32. The current wording was 
put in place by a constitutional amendment in 1998. Tennessee Prisoner 
Treatment and Conditions, Amendment 1 (1998), Ballotpedia, https:// 
ballotpedia.org/Tennessee_Prisoner_Treatment_and_Conditions,_Amen
dment_1_(1998) [https://perma.cc/X27N-J99P] (last visited Oct. 20, 
2017). The 1998 wording brings Tennessee in line with the federal 
minimalist formula enunciated in 1994 in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)), that 
“[t]he Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons’ . . . but neither 
does it permit inhumane ones.” 
15. While Tennessee changed its original wording, the Constitution of 
Wyoming, adopted in 1889, is an almost verbatim echo of the 1870 
Tennessee Constitution. See Wyo. Const. art. I, § 16 (“The erection of  
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Since the middle of the nineteenth century, even states that did not 
constitutionalize the conditions of imprisonment imposed a duty on 
state agencies to ensure that inmates were clothed, fed, and provided 
medicine and medical care.17 These statutory provisions vary in form 
and detail.18 Some statutes formulate basic requirements for prison 
healthcare—such as an initial physical and mental examination for all 
new inmates,19 or that inmates are required to contribute to healthcare 
expenditures through co-payments20—but then delegate the authority 
to prescribe more detailed standards for healthcare to the state’s de-
partment of corrections.21 Other statutes simply delegate all such 
 
 safe and comfortable prisons, and inspection of prisons, and the humane 
treatment of prisoners shall be provided for.”). 
16. Since 1868, the Georgia Constitution features an add-on to the federal 
version of the Eighth Amendment that provides “nor shall any person be 
abused in being arrested, while under arrest, or in prison.” Ga. Const. art. 
I, § 1, ¶ 17. See Dorothy T. Beasley, The Georgia Bill of Rights: Dead or 
Alive?, 34 Emory L.J. 341, 380–88 (1985) (comparing the Eighth 
Amendment and the Georgia Constitution and discussing the legislative 
history of this state constitutional provision); Caroline Davidson, State 
Constitutions and the Humane Treatment of Arrestees and Pretrial 
Detainees, 19 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 1, 23 n.91 (2014) (quoting additional 
state constitutions with similar provisions). 
17. E.g., State v. McCauley, 15 Cal. 429, 432 (1860) (citing an 1856 California 
law that required the state to write its contracts with private prison lessees 
so “as will conduce to the safety and convenience of keeping, working, 
clothing, feeding and providing medicine and medical attendance for the 
convicts of the state”). For some background on the private party in this 
suit, John McCauley, within the context of private leases of inmate labor 
in the nineteenth century, see Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and 
Private Prisons, 55 Duke L.J. 437, 451–54 (2005). 
18. This was already the observation of one commentator forty years ago. 
Slutsky, supra note 10, at 707–11. 
19. E.g., Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 9-602(f) (West 2002); 2017 N.C. 
Sess. Laws 2017-186; 42 R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-38(a) (West 2014). As of 
2015, at least 38 states had—by statute or regulation—authorized co-
payments for medical services provided to inmates which are waived when 
inmates cannot afford the co-payments. Michael Ollove, No Escaping 
Medical Copayments, Even in Prison, Pew Charitable Tr. (July 22, 
2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/ 
2015/07/22/no-escaping-medical-copayments-even-in-prison [https://perma. 
cc/U29V-5HQQ]. 
20. E.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-4.115(d)–4.115(e) (West 2017). 
21. E.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 904.108(d) (West 2017) (requiring that the 
standards to be established by the director of the department of corrections 
include the provision of “habilitative services and treatment” for inmates 
with intellectual disabilities); 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 2017-186. 
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decisions to the state agency responsible for running state prisons while 
setting very general22 or no parameters.23 
In formulating their healthcare policies, states—acting through 
their legislatures or competent agencies—have addressed a number of 
aspects of inmate healthcare,24 such as setting the community standard 
of care as the appropriate standard for healthcare provided to inmates.25 
They have also adopted and adapted elements of healthcare provision 
models employed in the general population, such as the continuous care 
model26 and the managed-care model.27 
 
22. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 18-81 (West 2016) (mandating that the 
state commissioner of corrections “establish rules for the administrative 
practices and custodial and rehabilitative methods . . . in accordance with 
recognized correctional standards”). 
23. E.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 1-15-1.4 (2012) (“The Department of 
Corrections, under the direction and control of the secretary of corrections, 
shall govern . . . the state penitentiary, and other state correctional 
facilities . . . .”). 
24. The healthcare manual of North Carolina’s Department of Public Safety 
addresses issues such as quality control measures, managed care and 
utilization reviews, patient’s rights, medical records, staff credentialing, 
intake screening of inmates, patient education, access to health services, 
medication administration, inmates with disabilities, dental care, continuity of 
care, and nutrition. Health Care Policy Manual, N.C. Pub. Safety, https:// 
www.ncdps.gov/Adult-Corrections/Prisons/Policy-Procedure-Manual/ 
Health-Care-Manual [https://perma.cc/VC7M-WE8C] (last visited Oct. 22, 
2017). 
25. E.g., State of Conn. Dep’t of Corr., Administrative Directive 8.1: 
Scope of Health Services Care 2–3 (2014), http://www.ct.gov/doc/ 
LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0801.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XCH-MCEL] [hereinafter 
Administrative Directive 8.1]. 
26. E.g., D.C. Code § 24-1401 (West 2013) (requiring the mayor to contract 
for provision of healthcare services “under a community-oriented healthcare 
services model,” i.e., “a delivery system in which one entity is responsible 
for managing . . . the full healthcare continuum”). 
27. E.g., Cal. Penal Code § 5023.2(a) (West 2011) (requiring the department 
of corrections to “maintain a statewide utilization management program” 
in order “to promote the best possible patient outcomes, eliminate 
unnecessary medical and pharmacy costs, and ensure consistency in the 
delivery of health care services”); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 501.146(a), 
(c) (West Supp. 2015) (requiring the state’s Correctional Managed Health 
Care Committee to “develop and approve a managed health care plan for 
all persons confined” by the state and to “provide expertise to the 
department [of corrections] . . . in developing policies and procedures for 
implementation of the managed health care plan”); N.C. Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety, Administrative Directive III-3, Utilization Review (UR) 
Plan 1 (2014), https://files.nc.gov/ncdps/documents/files/adIII3.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/LQ5R-SCDU] (assigning responsibility to the department’s 
Prison Health Services Utilization Management Section for “[e]stablishing 
and maintaining an effective Utilization Review Management Program”); 
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B. The Managed-Care Approach to Providing Healthcare in Prisons 
1. States Address the Rising Cost of Providing Medical Care to 
Prisoners 
States have seen their expenditures for prison healthcare rise 
rapidly.28 For example, annual healthcare expenditures per inmate 
ranged from $11,793 in California to $2,181 in Illinois in 2008.29 The 
median growth of per-inmate healthcare expenditures was 28 percent 
between 2001 and 2008.30 While ten states saw their overall healthcare 
spending mushroom by 90 percent or more, only two states saw de-
creased spending during this time.31 The median growth in this category 
was 49 percent.32 Healthcare expenditures in the forty-four states sub-
ject to a recent study totaled $6.5 billion in 2008, about one-sixth of 
the total correctional budgets in those states.33 
There are several reasons for increased cost of providing healthcare 
to inmates. An aging inmate population—in part due to extended 
sentences—is one of the main drivers of increased cost of medical care 
in state prison systems.34 Other factors that make the provision of 
healthcare in a prison setting more costly than for the general pop-
 
N.C. Dep’t of Corr., Administrative Directive III-7, Utilization 
Management Policies (2010), https://files.nc.gov/ncdps/documents/ 
files/adIII7.pdf [https://perma.cc/VUB4-S4JC] (prescribing in detail which 
medical procedures require utilization management approval by whom to 
provide care—primarily within the network of contracted providers and 
vendors—that meets constitutional and community standards of care). 
28. McDonald, supra note 9, at 451–52. 
29. Pew Charitable Tr., Managing Prison Health Care Spending 5 
(2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/ 
2014/pctcorrectionshealthcarebrief050814pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3XM-
2YCX]. 
30. Id. at 2. 
31. Id. The states with over 90 percent increases in overall healthcare spending 
were Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Maryland, Montana, New 
Hampshire, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. Id. at 3, 29. The two 
states with negative growth rates were Illinois and Texas. Id. 
32. Id. at 2. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 4, 8–11. While long-term inmates arrested in their youths and given 
extended mandatory sentences are a predictable cohort of aging inmates, 
there are also those inmates who were arrested at age fifty or older. Ronald 
H. Aday & Jennifer J. Krabill, Aging Offenders in the Criminal Justice 
System, 7 Marq. Elder’s Advisor 237, 237 (2006). Aday and Krabill go 
on to lay out the particular challenges faced by the elderly offender from 
arrest through incarceration, with special emphasis on meeting elderly 
inmates’ medical needs. Id. at 238–58. 
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ulation are the “[p]revalence of infectious and chronic diseases, mental 
illness, and substance abuse among inmates, many of whom enter pris-
ons with these problems,” as well as challenges that come with the dis-
tance of prisons from hospitals and other providers, and the need to 
guard inmates requiring off-site treatment.35 
States have developed a number of strategies to deal with the rising 
cost of providing health care to their prison populations. Establishing 
compassionate release programs for certain elderly inmates is one 
approach to cost containment employed by the states that is often 
controversial and infrequently used.36 Telemedicine is used to get in-
mates in, at times, remote prisons in contact with providers, obviating 
the need for some expensive off-site appointments and for bringing some 
providers to prisons.37 
While these two strategies are simply aimed at saving costs, the 
expansion of Medicaid access under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) 
functions as both a savings device and a cost-shifting mechanism. 
Savings are likely to be realized because studies suggest that access to 
healthcare after prison is a factor when it comes to recidivism.38 “[A]t 
 
35. Pew Charitable Tr., supra note 29, at 4, 8. 
36. See id. at 21–25. In Ohio, for example, “compassionate release” takes the 
form of a revocable quasi-pardon granted by the governor for certain 
offenders that are “terminally ill, medically incapacitated, or in imminent 
danger of death.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.05(B)–(C) (West Supp. 
2017). See Ohio Admin. Code 5120:1-1-40 (2013) (giving guidance on 
implementation). Neither the statute nor the regulation requires a state 
agency to see that the released inmate has access to necessary medical care. 
But see Model Penal Code § 305.7(9) (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft 
No. 2 2011) (requiring the department of corrections to “identify sources of 
medical and mental-health care available to the prisoner after release, and 
ensure that the prisoner is prepared for the transition to those services”). A 
comment to this section of the Model Penal Code notes that “[i]t would be 
perverse for § 305.7 to encourage the ‘dumping’ of ex-prisoners into the 
community without adequate provision for the continuing care that they 
need.” Id. at cmt. j. The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
has issued a policy requiring that eligible prisoners with a serious medical 
condition be enrolled in Medicaid prior to release and provided with a supply 
of essential medication. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., Offender 
Transitional Release Planning 6–7 (2017), http://www.drc.ohio.gov/ 
Portals/0/Policies/DRC%20Policies/78-REL-01%20Feb%202017).pdf?ver= 
2017-02-07-140722-280 [https://perma.cc/XXA9-ZZNN]. This policy applies 
to all inmates. Id. at 2. 
37. Pew Charitable Tr., supra note 29, at 12–14. 
38. Alexandra Gates, et al., Health Coverage and Care for the 
Adult Criminal Justice-Involved Population 5–6 (2014), https:// 
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/8622-health-coverage-
and-care-for-the-adult-criminal-justice-involved-population1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ZX3U-Q7FM]; Nan Myers, Managed Medicaid Braces for Influx 
of Ex-Inmates, Managed Care (Nov. 2014), https://www.managed 
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least 70% of the . . . 10 million people released from prison [and] jail 
each year are uninsured.”39 Under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, 
states are able to enroll a greater percentage of their low-income adult 
ex-inmate populations in Medicaid.40 Thus, savings may be realized by 
expansion states that provide for a seamless transition of released in-
mates to outside services by enrolling the inmates while still in prison.41 
Access to Medicaid after prison obviates the need to commit crime to 
have access to care and prevents recidivism due to uncontrolled health 
issues, such as substance abuse and mental illness.42 This is why it is 
 
caremag.com/archives/2014/11/managed-medicaid-braces-influx-ex-inmates 
[https://perma.cc/DEM9-EZ6F]. See also Robert B. Greifinger, Inmates as 
Public Health Sentinels, 22 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 253, 261 (2006) 
(“Community reintegration depends in large part on successful connections 
with community providers for the treatment of chronic diseases, mental 
illness, and communicable diseases.”). 
39. Myers, supra note 38. 
40. See Barr, supra note 5, at 217 (noting that the ACA changes to Medicaid 
made the program “analogous to Medicare, in that it will provide the same 
level of benefits to all those in poverty,” “regardless of health status or family 
status”). See also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, § 2001(a)(1)(C), 124 Stat. 119, 271 (2010) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012)); id. § 2001(a)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 
at 271–72 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(1) (2012)); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(e)(14)(I)(i) (cumulatively granting access to the minimum essential 
coverage under the Medicaid program to those whose annual income does 
not exceed 138 percent of the federal poverty guidelines). In 2018, 100 
percent of the federal poverty guidelines is $12,140 of annual income for a 
household of one. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Poverty 
Guidelines, ASPE, https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines [https://perma. 
cc/A6F5-2FWA] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). Each additional family member 
raises the guideline income by $4,320. Id. Accordingly, 138 percent of the 
poverty guidelines for a single person is $16,753.20 in annual income. See id. 
41. Myers, supra note 38. See generally Incarcerated People, HealthCare.gov, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/incarcerated-people/ [https://perma.cc/EAM8-
HUAH] (last visited Oct. 14, 2017) (explaining the modified enrollment 
process for former inmates). A seamless transition by pre-enrolling eligible 
inmates in Medicaid is not only desirable and very likely conducive to cost 
savings, but also, failing to do so in the case of sick inmates may represent 
a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Malavé, supra note 9, at 732–37; 
id. at 735–36 (citing Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (discussing Wakefield’s holding that the state’s duty to provide 
an inmate with necessary medication extends beyond the inmate’s release 
date for “the period of time reasonably necessary to permit him to consult 
a doctor and obtain a new supply”); Lugo v. Senkowski, 114 F. Supp. 2d 
111, 115 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying Wakefield to the case of a parolee 
who “was released in the midst of an ongoing surgical process,” i.e., when 
he required the removal of a metal stent from his kidney within weeks of 
his release). 
42. Myers, supra note 38. 
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important that, following passage of the ACA, Medicaid’s “essential 
health benefits” available also to ex-inmates now include mental health 
and substance-use-disorder services.43 
Yet the Medicaid expansion also functions as a cost-shifting device. 
This is because the Social Security Act—since its 1965 amendments—
allows states to shift to the federal budget between fifty percent and 
eighty-three percent of treatment costs incurred while an inmate 
enrolled in Medicaid receives inpatient services for twenty-four hours 
or more in a medical facility outside the prison walls.44 Prior to the 
Medicaid expansion, this provision applied only to a small percentage 
of inmates and largely escaped the states’ notice.45 But the shift from 
only covering “low-income juveniles, pregnant women, adults with dis-
abilities and frail elders” to covering also able-bodied adults with 
income below 138 percent of the federal poverty guideline in expansion 
states makes virtually all of their inmate populations eligible.46 Yet 
while the ACA increased the number of eligible inmates, it did not en-
hance the services covered, as Medicaid for inmates still only covers 
“inpatient health services delivered beyond prison walls.”47 
Finally, another cost-saving strategy employed by states is 
outsourcing prison healthcare to contractors.48 Some of these con-
tractors—such as the contractor employed by the State of Connecticut 
discussed below49—apply the kind of managed-care strategies discussed 
in the following Section. 
 
43. Joel B. Teitelbaum & Laura G. Hoffman, Health Reform and Correctional 
Health Care: How the Affordable Care Act Can Improve the Health of Ex-
Offenders and Their Communities, 40 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1323, 1351 
(2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012)). 
44. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79 Stat. 286, 
352 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(29)(A), (b)(1) (2012)); 42 
C.F.R. § 435.1010 (2016). See also Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
State Health Official Letter to Facilitate Successful Re-Entry for Individuals 
Transitioning from Incarceration to Their Communities 11 (April 28, 2016), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/sho16007.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7W77-SJV3]. 
45. Christine Vestal, Medicaid Expansion Seen Covering Nearly All State 
Prisoners, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www. 
pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2011/10/18/Medicaid 
-expansion-seen-covering-nearly-all-state-prisoners [https://perma.cc/WPB4-
SEKJ]. 
46. Id. 
47. Id.; Gates et al., supra note 38, at 6; Teitelbaum & Hoffman, supra note 
43, at 1346, 1346 n.129 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(29)(A) (2012); 42 
C.F.R. § 435.1009(b) (2012)). 
48. Pew Charitable Tr., supra note 29, at 15–17. 
49. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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2. The Rise of Managed Healthcare in the U.S.: A Brief History 
State prison authorities did not invent the concept of managed care, 
but a number of them employ elements of the model authorized by 
Congress and state legislatures for the general population across the 
U.S. to curb healthcare expenditures.50 Managed healthcare goes back 
to the early twentieth century where local organizations sought to pro-
vide healthcare to a defined population.51 Due to opposition by the 
American Medical Association (“AMA”)—sanctioning any member 
who participated in the organizations the AMA deemed unethical—
many of the early organizations went out of business.52 Some, however, 
prospered and beginning in the 1930s became particularly popular with 
organized labor.53 
These organizations were set up as an alternative to the traditional 
indemnity insurance plans that—following a fee-for-service model—re-
imbursed patients for the fees they had paid to a healthcare provider 
based on individual services performed.54 The new organizations func-
tioned as prepaid service plans where the members’ premiums provided 
a limited amount of money by which a set number of services and ex-
penditures—e.g., physician salaries—needed to be covered.55 As it 
turned out, the new organizations, initially called “prepaid group prac-
tice” based on their financing model, were able to provide services at a 
lower cost than the traditional fee-for-service insurance plans without 
lowering the quality of healthcare.56 
Motivated in part by the savings achieved by the prepaid plans, 
Congress passed the Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”) Act 
 
50. See supra note 27. 
51. Barr, supra note 5, at 118. 
52. Id. at 119. The AMA likened the early organizations to “medical soviets.” 
Id. at 120. The AMA’s opposition to these organizations was rooted in its 
resistance to “contract medicine” or “corporate medicine” at the time, that 
is, to the practice of physicians being employed by organizations not led by 
physicians, e.g., corporations. Nicole Huberfeld, Be Not Afraid of Change: 
Time to Eliminate the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 14 Health 
Matrix 243, 245–48 (2004). The AMA’s subsequent lobbying efforts 
resulted in licensure statutes adopted by the states. Id. at 249–51. And they 
also led to the judge-made “corporate practice of medicine doctrine.” Id. at 
251–52. This doctrine is relevant for the matter at hand and will be 
discussed in some detail in Part II.E. 
53. Barr, supra note 5, at 119–26. 
54. Id. at 118. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 122–23. 
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of 1973.57 The HMO Act preempted state laws outlawing HMOs, offered 
federal subsidies for new HMOs, and defined minimum standards for 
an HMO to be “federally qualified.” These standards included the re-
quirement that HMOs had to be organized on a nonprofit basis, offer 
specified benefits to all members, and charge all members the same 
monthly premiums.58 Since the 1980s, federal and state governments 
have contracted with HMOs to manage the provision of medical services 
under Medicare59 and Medicaid.60 
 
57. Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e 
to 300e-17 (2012)). The initial passage and implementation of the Act was 
resisted by the AMA. Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 747–48 (1979). 
This was, at least in part, because the AMA considered the fee-for-service 
approach to be the only “ethical” mode of remuneration for physicians. 
Id. at 1016. Another reason was that the AMA’s ethical guidelines 
prohibited physicians from entering into partnerships with non-physicians 
that involved splitting of professional fees. Id. at 1017. But the Federal 
Trade Commission held this stance to be anticompetitive in violation of 
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 
38 Stat. 717, 719–21 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 
(2012)), and required the AMA to modify its ethical guidelines to allow 
physicians to accept remuneration other than fee-for-service and to 
participate in HMOs. Id. at 1017–18; see Huberfeld, supra note 52, at 255–
56. 
58. Barr, supra note 5, at 124, 130. 
59. “Generally, Medicare is available for people age 65 or older, younger people 
with disabilities and people with End Stage Renal Disease (permanent 
kidney failure requiring dialysis or transplant). . . . While most people do 
not have to pay a premium for Part A [inpatient hospital care], everyone 
must pay for Part B [outpatient medical services and supplies] if they want 
it.” U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. Who Is Eligible for 
Medicare?, HHS.gov (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.hhs.gov/answers/ 
medicare-and-medicaid/who-is-elibible-for-medicare/index.html [https:// 
perma.cc/ZN5R-ST8P]; What Medicare Covers, Medicare.gov, https:// 
www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/index.html [https://perma.cc/5S 
E9-2UA4] (last visited Oct. 27, 2017). Medicare Advantage Plans are “[a] 
type of Medicare health plan offered by a private company that contracts 
with Medicare to provide you with all your Part A and Part B benefits. 
Medicare Advantage Plans include Health Maintenance Organizations . . . .” 
Medicare Advantage Plans, Medicare.gov, https://www.medicare.gov/ 
sign-up-change-plans/medicare-health-plans/medicare-advantage-plans/ 
medicare-advantage-plans.html [https://perma.cc/446Y-6WEM] (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2017). See Barr, supra note 5, at 161–74 (discussing, in detail, the 
role of HMOs in providing care for Medicare beneficiaries). 
60. Medicaid, a joint federal and state program, serves “[l]ow income families, 
qualified pregnant women and children, and individuals receiving 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI),” as well as other eligibility groups. 
Eligibility, Medicaid.gov, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/eligibility/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/8DKY-WG7W] (last visited Oct. 20, 2017); see 
also Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Services, National Summary 
of State Medicaid Managed Care Programs (2012), https:// 
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By the end of the 1980s, Congress, adopting a different economic 
paradigm, had considerably deregulated HMOs, even allowing them to 
operate on a for-profit basis.61 As a result, while nearly 90 percent of 
HMO patients were members of nonprofit HMOs in 1981, nearly two-
thirds of HMO patients were enrolled in for-profit enterprises by 1998.62 
The broad popularity HMOs once enjoyed disappeared as a result of 
the paradigm shift.63 And while the once dominant HMOs have been 
displaced by Preferred Provider Organizations (“PPOs”) that allow for 
greater choice among providers, the dominance of the for-profit model 
in healthcare remains unabated.64 
In the 1990s, for-profit HMOs developed a number of strategies to 
control costs by controlling the utilization of healthcare services, such 
as using primary care physicians as gatekeepers for specialty services, 
utilization review, and providing a variety of financial incentives to 
physicians.65 By adopting these strategies, for-profit HMOs seek to se-
cure higher profits by lowering pay-out rates for medical care.66 Non-
 
www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/delivery 
-systems/downloads/medicaid-mc-enrollment-report.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/AEZ7-83AB] (summarizing the numerous state Medicaid programs using 
managed care as of 2012). See also Barr, supra note 5, at 204–05 (noting 
that by 2014, “between 50 and 75 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries, 
depending on the state in which they lived, were enrolled in managed care 
plans” and that states seek to minimize their financial liability by allocating 
a fixed annual payment for each beneficiary—“capitation”). 
61. Barr, supra note 5, at 254. 
62. Id. at 253–54. 
63. Id. at 252–53. 
64. Id. at 254. 
65. Id. at 255–57. 
66. Id. at 260 (noting that for-profit HMOs have a markedly lower “medical loss 
ratio” (“MLR”)—the percentage of premiums that pay for medical care—
than nonprofits, 70–85 percent versus 95 percent). Since 2016, states may 
mandate an MLR of at least 85 percent for managed-care plans within their 
Medicaid programs. 81 Fed. Reg. 27,498, 27,862 (May 6, 2016) (codified as 
amended at 42 C.F.R. § 438.8(c) (2016)). For a discussion of average MLRs 
in Medicaid managed-care plans from 2011 to 2014, see id. at 27,837–38. 
While there does not seem to be a specific MLR for Medicaid, insurers 
offering a plan under Medicaid Advantage also must meet an MLR of 85 
percent. This regulatory requirement goes back to a 2010 statute, but the 
final rule was first published in 2013. 78 Fed. Reg. 31,284, 31,307 (May 23, 
2013) (codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. § 422.2410(b) (2016)); Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1103, 124 
Stat. 1029, 1047 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-27(e)(4) (2012)). 
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profit HMOs employ these strategies to a lesser extent.67 Accordingly, 
studies have found the quality of care provided under for-profit plans 
to be lower than that under nonprofit plans.68 
3. Managed Care in Prisons: The Example of Connecticut 
a. Background and Policy 
Connecticut has engaged in providing managed healthcare since 
1997.69 To do so, the Department of Correction contracted with the 
state university, specifically a division of the University of Connecticut 
Health Center called Correctional Managed Health Care (“CMHC”).70 
Between 2001 and 2008, Connecticut achieved below-average increases 
in total and per-inmate healthcare spending.71 Connecticut is one of the 
 
67. Peter B. Jurgeleit, Note, Physician Employment Under Managed Care: 
Toward A Retaliatory Discharge Cause of Action for HMO-Affiliated 
Physicians, 73 IND. L.J. 255, 264 n.49 (1997). 
68. Barr, supra note 5, at 262–64. 
69. John C. Geragosian & Robert J. Kane, Auditors’ Report: 
Department of Correction Fiscal Years Ended June 30, 2012 and 
2013, at 30 (2017), https://www.cga.ct.gov/apa/reports/Correction,% 
20Department%20of_20170510_FY2012,2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/32KV-
GZ5Y]. 
70. Id. 
71. The total healthcare spending in Connecticut rose by 16 percent, compared 
to a median rise of 49 percent in the forty-four states surveyed; the per-
inmate spending in Connecticut rose by 7 percent, compared to a median 
rise of 28 percent. Pew Charitable Tr., supra note 29, at 2, 29. 
72. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-85a (West 2016). The departmental regulation 
created under this section provides that inmates are charged a fee of $3.00 
for each medical visit, each dental procedure, and each eyeglass prescription, 
except when medical staff determine that emergency care—as defined in the 
regulation—is required; when the medical / dental appointment is initiated 
by medical staff; when the inmate is undergoing scheduled follow-up medical 
treatment for chronic diseases; or when the treatment is for mental health 
reasons. In case of insufficient funds in the inmate’s trust account, services 
will be provided, but the state will create an obligation to be satisfied by 
funds deposited in the account in the future. STATE OF CONN. DEP’T OF 
CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE 3.12: FEES FOR PROGRAMS AND 
SERVICES 1–2 (2017), http://www.portal.ct.gov/-/media/DOC/Pdf/ 
Ad/ad0312pdf.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/2SGT-CHXY]. Connecticut 
pays its inmate labor force between $0.75 and $1.75 per day. STATE OF 
CONN. DEP’T OF CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE 10.1: INMATE 
ASSIGNMENT AND PAY PLAN 6 (2015), http://www.portal.ct.gov/-
/media/DOC/Pdf/Ad/ad1001pdf.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/C6BD-
FFK2]. This pay rate makes a fee of $3.00 for each inmate-initiated visit not 
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states collecting inmate co-pay for the provision of medical services in 
certain circumstances.72 The state holds prison medical providers to the 
community standard of care.73 
Department of Correction policy specifies which medical services 
are to be provided to the inmates on a routine basis and when utili-
zation review becomes necessary.74 Medical services not subject to 
utilization review include daily sick call, dental care including dentures, 
diagnostic services, pharmacy services, OB/GYN services, eyeglasses, 
hearing aids, prostheses, chronic care, mental health services, pre-
ventive care, and immunizations.75 Utilization review comes into play 
 
 insubstantial. Assuming an average pay of $1.25 per day, this would 
correspond to a co-payment of $193.92 for a person grossing $80.80 in an 
eight-hour day under Connecticut’s current minimum wage rate. 
Connecticut’s Medicaid beneficiaries do not have to contribute any co-
payments. MARY FITZPATRICK & ALEX REGER, COPAYMENTS AND 
DEDUCTIBLES IN MEDICAID AND HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS 2 (2015), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2015/rpt/pdf/2015-R-0160.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3GLC-VLTR]. 
73. Administrative Directive 8.1, supra note 25, at 3 (“The contracted 
health services provider and [the Department of Correction] shall provide all 
inmates access to healthcare services that meet community standards.”). The 
regulation defines “community standard” as follows: “The scope and quality 
of medical, dental and mental health services . . . that is consistent with 
generally accepted practice parameters in the State of Connecticut as 
recognized by healthcare providers in the same or similar general specialty 
(as to typically treat or manage the diagnosis or condition . . . ).” Id. at 2. 
The community standard is the standard adopted by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court for medical malpractice actions brought by the general 
population. See, e.g., Jarmie v. Troncale, 50 A.3d 802, 808 (Conn. 2012) 
(“[P]rofessional negligence or malpractice . . . [is] defined as the failure of one 
rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning 
commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the 
average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, 
loss, or damage to the recipient of those services . . . .” (quoting Gold v. 
Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 811 A.2d 1266, 1270 (Conn. 2002))). The 
Department of Correction defines “community” to be coextensive with 
“state.” See Administrative Directive 8.1, supra note 25, at 2. But that 
geographic limitation was abandoned by the Connecticut Supreme Court in 
1983. Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 304–05 (Conn. 1983) 
(adopting a national standard of care). State law makes no reference to any 
geographic boundaries, as it requires medical professionals to exercise “that 
level of care, skill and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding 
circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably 
prudent similar health care providers.” Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-
184c(a) (West 2013). See Jennifer S.R. Lynn, Connecticut Medical 
Malpractice, 12 U. Bridgeport L. Rev. 381, 393–94 (1992). 
74. Administrative Directive 8.1, supra note 25, at 4–11. 
75. Id. at 4–7. 
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for unspecified off-site specialty services, treatment therapies such as 
chemotherapy and dialysis, and elective care.76 
The policies of the provider, CMHC, supply additional details as to 
when utilization review is indicated, e.g., in the case of more complex 
dental surgical procedures, outpatient hospital dental services,77 and 
transferring emergency patients.78 Utilization review is also required for 
specialty health services, such as “[o]ff-site, [o]ut-[p]atient [h]ealth 
[s]ervices,” hemodialysis, prostheses, individualized wheelchairs, emer-
gency rooms, and acute inpatient hospitalizations.79 
CMHC police also sheds light on how utilization review is to be 
conducted: Unless the review request originates from a specialty consul-
tation conducted outside of prison,80 the practitioner in the correctional 
facility housing the patient examines the inmate-patient to see if there 
is a need for referral for specialty health services.81 If there appears to 
be a need for referral, the practitioner submits the utilization review 
request to the reviewing authority.82 
The reviewing authority varies depending on the priority of the 
request and the medical discipline involved: All specialty healthcare 
that is priority 1 (“emergency care and/or admission to an acute health 
care facility”) and priority 2 (conditions that require action within a 
week) are pre-authorized by CMHC’s utilization review staff, the clin-
ical director, the dental services coordinator, or the physician utilization 
review panel consisting of three CMHC physicians.83 Priority 1 requests 
are scrutinized by retrospective utilization review after the services have 
 
76. Id. at 7, 11. 
77. UConn Health Correctional Managed Health Care Policy and 
Procedures: E 6.01 Oral Care Services 4 (revised 2012), 
https://health.uconn.edu/correctional/wp-content/uploads/sites/77/2016/ 
12/E-Inmate-Care-and-Treatment.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6GZ-TVRB]. 
78. UConn Health Correctional Managed Health Care Policy and 
Procedures: E 8.01 Emergency Services 1 (revised 2016), https:// 
health.uconn.edu/correctional/wp-content/uploads/sites/77/2016/12/E-
Inmate-Care-and-Treatment.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6GZ-TVRB]. 
79. UConn Health Correctional Managed Health Care Policy and 
Procedures: E 10.04 Specialty Health Service Requests 1 (2014), 
https://health.uconn.edu/correctional/wp-content/uploads/sites/77/2016/ 
12/E-Inmate-Care-and-Treatment.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6GZ-TVRB] 
[hereinafter Specialty Health Service Requests]. 
80. For the process in case of such consultations, see id. at 3–4. 
81. Id. at 2. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1–2. It is not clear whether the clinical director and the dental services 
coordinator are employees of the department of correction or CMHC. 
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been provided.84 Priority 2 requests are reviewed no later than the 
following business day after the inmate’s local physician contacts the 
department of correction’s clinical director or the dental services coor-
dinator.85 Medical requests of a lower priority are reviewed in a routine 
review process by the CMHC physicians review panel during its weekly 
meetings.86 The dental services coordinator reviews all requests for 
dental services under utilization review, and the director of mental 
health and psychiatry reviews all requests mental services under utili-
zation review.87 
The officials or bodies performing utilization review approve those 
requests that meet “established clinical guidelines.”88 CMHC policy that 
is readily accessible to inmates or their families does not specify what 
these guidelines may entail in addition to, or in contravention of, rec-
ognized community standards of medical care. 
At any rate, requests that do not meet these standards are rejected. 
Inmates or their local physicians may appeal a negative decision if they 
believe the rejection was not warranted.89 The Department of Correc-
tion’s clinical director is the sole reviewing authority; the clinical 
director’s decision is final.90 The physician is then responsible for 
discussing the result with the inmate.91 
b. Practice 
Policy is one thing; practice is another.92 In June 2017, “eight 
wrongful-death [actions] [we]re pending against the [Department of 
 
84. Id. at 1, 3. While readily available provider policy does not spell out the 
consequences of a retrospective denial, the result for providers in the general 
CMHC is that they will not get paid for the services performed. Allison Faber 
Walsh, Comment, The Legal Attack on Cost Containment Mechanisms: The 
Expansion of Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 31 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207, 217 (1997). 
85. Specialty Health Service Requests, supra note 79, at 4. 
86. Id. at 4–5. 
87. Id. at 4. It is not clear whether the director of mental health is an employee 
of the department of correction or CMHC. 
88. Id. at 5. 
89. Id. at 6. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 7. 
92. Connecticut prison healthcare policy is, in part, driven by a number of 
federal court rulings and consent decrees. See Administrative Directive 
8.1, supra note 25, at 1 (listing nine lawsuits in the regulation’s “Authority 
and Reference” section). Among the suits listed are Lareau v. Manson and 
Campos v. Manson, two class actions that were consolidated by the court in 
Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980), aff’d in part, 651 
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Correction] in state or federal court, or the claims commissioner’s of-
fice.”93 Also in 2017, a report by state auditors covering Fiscal Years 
2012 and 2013 identified several significant deficiencies in Connecticut’s 
delivery of healthcare to its inmates.94 
This report found, in general, that the Department of Correction 
was not exercising a sufficient degree of oversight over CMHC as a re-
sult of “[v]agueness in contractual terms and a general absence of 
measurable performance standards.”95 Specifically, the contract 
between the Department and CMHC allowed the contractor to police 
itself when it came to reviewing inmate deaths.96 Moreover, contrary to 
the terms of the contract, neither the state nor CMHC had pursued the 
accreditation of healthcare provided to inmates with national organ-
izations such as the American Correctional Association97 or the National 
 
F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981). The district court’s memorandum decision found that 
the inmates’ health was prejudiced by overcrowding and the absence of 
intake screening for communicable diseases. Id. at 1178. The district court 
had to revisit the issues of overcrowding and infectious disease, specifically 
HIV/AIDS, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, resulting in two consent 
decrees, one of which is In re Connecticut Prison Overcrowding and AIDS 
Cases, Nos. H-80-506(JAC), Civ. H-88-562(PCD), (JGM), 1990 WL 261348 
(D. Conn. Dec. 6, 1990). See Deborah S. Chang & Patricia E. McCooey, Out 
of the Dark Ages and into the Nineties: Prisons’ Response to Inmates with 
AIDS, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 1001, 1003–04 (1991) (giving context of early 1990s 
and the positive impact of the two AIDS-related consent decrees on prison 
conditions in Connecticut); see also State of Conn. Dept. of Corr., 
Administrative Directive No. 8.11: Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
Infection/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 1 (2008), 
http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0811.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
69JV-E5JM] (stating the department of correction’s current HIV/AIDS 
policy). 
93. Josh Kovner, Concerns Growing Over Inmates’ Medical Care; 25 Cases 
Flagged, Including Eight Deaths, Hartford Courant (June 15, 2017, 1:37 
PM), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-inmate-deaths-
medical-care-20170615-story.html [https://perma.cc/MPP6-PDFZ]. 
94. Geragosian & Kane, supra note 69, at 30–36. 
95. Id. at 33. Some contracts between government agencies and private 
healthcare providers contain indemnity clauses that require the private 
provider to pay for any legal costs of government agencies, thereby 
providing disincentives to effective government oversight. See Dan Weiss, 
Comment, Privatization and Its Discontents: The Troubling Record of 
Privatized Prison Health Care, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 725, 753–56 (2015). 
96. Geragosian & Kane, supra note 69, at 33. 
97. See Health Care Accreditation, Am. Correctional Association, http:// 
www.aca.org/ACA_Prod_IMIS/ACA_Member/Healthcare/Health_Accred
itation/ACA_Member/Healthcare_Professional_Interest_Section/HC_Acc
reditationHome.aspx?hkey=5b21416b-fee4-47fd-9eed-2597879e7076 [https:// 
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Commission on Correctional Health Care98 that have developed stand-
ards for the provision of healthcare to prison inmates.99 
Additionally, the state auditors perceived the relationship between 
the department and CMHC to be a joint venture between equals, not 
one where the Department set and enforced policy within the applicable 
constitutional and statutory parameters.100 Moreover, the Department 
was not sufficiently staffed to monitor compliance with the complex 
contract governing CMHC’s services to the state inmates.101 
Finally, given that managed care is often touted as the way of 
curbing the burgeoning cost of providing care to inmates while im-
proving the quality of care, two findings in the report are perhaps most 
damning. First, the report found that the medical care budget set forth 
in the Department’s contract with CMHC impaired effective analysis 
and management of costs because it understated the real cost of health-
care services provided by CMHC and was not detailed enough.102 
Second, the Department had not adequately documented whatever 
quality review it had performed.103 The Department of Correction’s re-
sponse essentially agreed with the assessment and stated that it was in 
the process of renegotiating its contract with CMHC to address the 
issues identified.104 
4. Legal Responses to Managed Care in the Prison Context 
a. The Constitutional Route 
Some commentators have argued that implementing a managed-
care model in the prison setting can amount to cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Estelle 
 
perma.cc/2B3P-KRTF] (last visited Oct. 20, 2017) (discussing the American 
Correctional Association’s Health Care accreditation process). 
98. See Accreditation: Pursuit of Excellence, Nat’l Commission on 
Correctional Health Care, http://www.ncchc.org/accreditation-
programs [https://perma.cc/R732-VS2X] (last visited Oct. 14, 2017) 
(discussing the NCCHC accreditation process). 
99. Geragosian & Kane, supra note 69, at 32. 
100. Id. at 34. 
101. Id. at 34–35. 
102. Id. at 34. 
103. Id. at 33. 
104. Id. at 35–36. As part of its response, in May 2017, the department published 
a regulation specifically addressing its deficient quality review procedures 
identified in the report. See State of Conn. Dep’t of Corr., 
Administrative Directive 8.10: Quality Assurance and 
Improvement (2017), http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad08 
10.pdf [https://perma.cc/AE4M-YR2H]. 
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v. Gamble and its progeny.105 They reason that this model may delay, 
or deny, the provision of medical care to inmates due to fiscal con-
siderations, i.e., “non-medical reasons.”106 
This problem is not new. Factoring in non-medical considerations 
when it comes to providing healthcare to inmates—e.g., budgetary 
constraints—is not a problem created by the advent of managed care 
in prisons. Prison officials have raised a “cost defense” in prison medical 
care cases beginning in the early 1990s,107 even without the presence of 
the managed-care incentives discussed above.108 And while this “cost-
defense” has apparently been unsuccessful on the federal level,109 in at 
least one state, Indiana, the standard of care for medical providers 
expressly allows the trier of fact to consider budgetary constraints faced 
by prison medical providers as one of the relevant circumstances when 
deciding whether the provider breached that standard.110 
At the same time, what is different under managed-care approaches 
to prison medical care is that, in typical HMO-style contracts, the 
provision of less costly medical care is contractually coupled with finan-
 
105. E.g., Ira P. Robbins, Managed Health Care in Prisons as Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 195 (1999); Richard Siever, 
Note, HMOs Behind Bars: Constitutional Implications of Managed Health 
Care in the Prison System, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1365 (2005). 
106. Robbins, supra note 105, at 196 (citing Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 
769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985)). Ancata v. Prison Health Services 
involved a Florida pre-trial detainee who raised the claim, among others, 
that he was denied medical care because he refused to pay for it, resulting 
in a fatal delay of care. Ancata, 796 F.2d at 702, 704. In general, pre-trial 
detainees are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Eighth 
Amendment because they, by definition, cannot be subject to “punishment,” 
but the Supreme Court has held that this standard is at least as stringent as 
the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 703 n.5 (citing City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. 
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)). 
107. Barbara Kritchevsky, Is There a Cost Defense? Budgetary Constraints As a 
Defense in Civil Rights Actions, 35 Rutgers L.J. 483, 529–30 (2004). 
Kritchevsky noted that the frequency of raising the “cost defense” increased 
after the Supreme Court’s decisions Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), 
and Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993), that factored a consideration 
of objective constraints into their analysis as to whether a defendant had the 
requisite mens rea. Id. at 495–98. 
108. See supra Part I.B.2. 
109. Kritchevsky, supra note 107, at 529–30. 
110. Allen v. Hinchman, 20 N.E.3d 863, 870–71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). See also 
Moss v. Miller, 625 N.E.2d 1044, 1051 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing the 
necessary existence of constraints in the prison setting that “may well” 
negatively impact the delivery of medical services but should not lead to 
liability for the “medical arts practitioner”). For a discussion of the standard 
of care in medical malpractice actions brought by inmates, see infra notes 
142–145 and accompanying text. 
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cial incentives benefitting those providers that use less costly medical 
care.111 And it is here that some courts have raised a red flag. For 
example, in Bowman v. Corrections Corporation of America,112 a fed-
eral case from Tennessee, the district court held a particular contract 
with a prison medical provider to violate “contemporary standards of 
decency,” not due to the existence of financial incentives per se, but 
because of their excessive nature.113 But the Sixth Circuit reversed this 
finding because, due to the inmate’s death, the issue had become moot 
and the plaintiff—the inmate’s mother—had no standing.114 Besides, 
the jury had found the defendant physician not liable based on expert 
testimony that the treatment provided to the inmate was 
“appropriate.”115 
b. State-Law Responses 
While the constitutional jurisprudence on managed care in prisons 
is emerging, state law might, at least for now, provide more promising 
avenues of addressing potential problems of managed care in prisons. 
This is especially true because a powerful obstacle to state regulation 
of managed-care organizations—federal preemption of state law for 
managed-care plans offered by employers under the Employee 
Retirement Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)116—is inapplicable to the 
provision of managed care to state prisoners since they are not covered 
by ERISA.117 Moreover, the Supreme Court has identified the legislative 
 
111. Timothy S. Hall, Bargaining with Hippocrates: Managed Care and the 
Doctor-Patient Relationship, 54 S.C. L. Rev. 689, 694–95 (2002). 
112. 188 F. Supp. 2d 870 (M.D. Tenn. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 350 
F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2003). 
113. Id. at 890. The district court based its holding on statements by the AMA 
and Medicare regulations. Id. at 887–90. 
114. Bowman, 350 F.3d at 549–51. 
115. Id. at 544–45. 
116. Pub L. 93-403, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. ch. 18 (2012)). The 
“shifting sands of the ERISA preemption doctrine” are discussed in Hall, 
supra note 111, at 699–705, and in Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. 
Richards, Health Care’s “Thirty Years War”: The Origins and Dissolution 
of Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 297–315 (2004). See 
also Cameron Krier, Comment, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The 
Impact of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila on ERISA and Patients’ Rights, 38 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 127 (2005) (discussing the impact of Aetna Health Inc. 
v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), on state laws giving patients a cause of action 
for damages against HMOs that are administering employee benefits and 
are, therefore, potentially preempted by ERISA’s more modest remedial 
measures). 
117. The HMO Act’s preemption of state law regulating managed-care 
organizations is more limited. Huberfeld, supra note 52, at 277−78. 
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branch as best suited to make the kind of judgments “about socially 
acceptable medical risk” involved in reining in non-medical consider-
ations in the context of patient care.118 
Accordingly, some states have begun regulating financial incentives 
when it comes to providing medical care.119 And the federal government 
has done the same in relation to the role of financial incentives in the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs.120 
Additionally, tort law has developed the concept of apparent 
agency under which hospitals and managed-care organizations may be 
held vicariously liable for the provider decisions they control to one 
degree or another.121 Such organizations may also be held directly liable 
for negligent hiring and retention of their medical providers.122 Under 
these and other theories, liability for the provision of defective health-
 
118. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 221−22 (2000). 
119. Hall, supra note 111, at 712−15; Michael J. Miles, Note, State Regulation of 
HMO Physician Financial Incentives: Finding the Proper Balance Between 
Motivating Financial Prudence and Protecting Quality of Care, 36 
Rutgers L.J. 651, 663–71 (2005) (discussing several approaches taken by 
states, e.g., mandatory disclosure of financial incentives, prohibition of 
financial incentives, and prohibition of financial incentives to reduce 
medically necessary treatment). But see McLean & Richards, supra note 
116, at 319–21 (expressing concern that state regulation of HMOs will 
increase the cost of medical care when it is driven more by headlines 
focusing on individual bad cases than a scientific approach to determining 
which procedure may be reasonable in a given case). 
120. Hall, supra note 111, at 709–10 (discussing 42 C.F.R. § 417.479 (2000)). 
While 42 C.F.R. § 417.479 deals specifically with physician incentive plans 
for Medicare, managed-care organizations in Medicaid are constrained by 
similar limitations imposed under Medicare Advantage. 42 C.F.R. 
§ 438.700(b)(6) (2016) (referencing Medicare Advantage regulations 42 
C.F.R. §§ 422.208, 422.210). See supra notes 59–61 (discussing the 
difference between Medicare and Medicare Advantage). 
121. Jane Elaine Ballerini, The Apparent Agency Doctrine in Connecticut’s 
Medical Malpractice Jurisprudence: Using Legal Doctrine as a Platform for 
Change, 13 QuiNNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 317, 342 (2010) (noting that for many 
courts applying the doctrine of apparent agency, “the touchstone . . . is 
control—that is, how much control the hospital or health care entity has 
over the physician”). But the control exercised in the managed care model, 
as evidenced in the Connecticut approach discussed above, typically focuses 
mostly on expensive forms of treatment, not on every ordinary treatment 
decision a physician may make. Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of 
Torts § 318 (2d ed., updated June 2017); see also Jenna R. Feldman, Note, 
Medical Malpractice Liability and Accountability: Potential Legal 
Ramifications and Solutions for Florida Accountable Care Organizations, 
69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1073, 1098–99 (2015) (discussing a 2003 Florida case 
where an HMO’s vicarious liability for medical malpractice turned on 
whether the treating physicians were agents of the HMO). 
122. Dobbs et al., supra note 121, § 318. 
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care can also attach to state agencies employing or contracting with 
medical providers as well as to those providers themselves. The next 
Part will explore these issues within the context of litigating prison 
medical claims under current state medical malpractice and tort law. 
II. Litigating Prison Healthcare as State Medical 
Malpractice and Tort Claims 
A. The Background: Common-Law Duty of Care for Prisoners and 
Obstacles to Inmate Suits 
For at least three quarters of a century before the Supreme Court 
articulated a constitutional right to adequate medical care in prison,123 
the common law had held that prison officials owed a duty of “ordinary 
and reasonable care for [the inmate’s] life and health.”124 After all, “[i]t 
is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who 
cannot, by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.”125 
In fact, after striking down the civil-rights claim of inadequate medical 
treatment brought by a Texas inmate under the Eighth Amendment 
 
123. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 
825, 832 (1994). 
124. Indiana ex rel. Tyler v. Gobin, 94 F. 48, 50 (C.C.D. Ind. 1899). The court 
in Tyler recognized a dual duty of the sheriff as the custodian of the inmate: 
He owed a duty to the state to produce the prisoner “in court at the time 
of the trial.” Id. He also owed a duty of reasonable care to the prisoner, as 
noted. Id. Accord Kusah v. McCorkle, 170 P. 1023, 1025 (Wash. 1918) 
(citing McPhee v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 100 P. 174, 175 (Wash. 1909)). 
Tyler arrived at this conclusion by reasoning from analogy: as it is 
established that the sheriff has a duty to safeguard property and animals 
seized by virtue of his office, “why should not the law impose the duty of 
care upon him in respect of human beings who are in his custody by virtue 
of his office?” Id. Under this duty, sheriffs and similar officials were held 
liable under the then relatively new wrongful-death statutes enacted by the 
states following English precedent. E.g., Asher v. Cabell, 50 F. 818, 827 (5th 
Cir. 1892) (holding that a U.S. marshal owed his prisoner the duty “of safe-
keeping and protection from unlawful injury” and that Texas wrongful-
death statute entitled prisoner’s widow to pursue a wrongful-death action 
against the defendant). William Blackstone commented that sheriffs had 
the duty to keep prisoners in “safe custody” and remarked that “[t]he abuses 
of goalers and sheriff’s officers toward the unfortunate persons in their 
custody are well restrained and guarded against.” 1 William Blackstone, 
Commentaries *332, *335. 
125. Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926). See supra note 13 
(discussing North Carolina’s 1868 Constitutional provision on inmate 
health). Tyler agrees: “Is a helpless prisoner in the custody of a sheriff less 
entitled to his care than a bale of goods or a dumb beast? The law is not 
subject to any such reproach.” Tyler, 94 F. at 50. 
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and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court noted that the inmate could 
pursue a medical malpractice claim under Texas law.126 
Thus, it would appear the most natural course of action for state 
prisoners who believe their medical care in prison was inadequate to file 
a claim under the state’s tort laws or the state’s medical malpractice 
laws. While this course may appear natural, it is by no means easy. To 
be sure, some of the earlier obstacles to bringing such claims have been 
removed, such as the notion that certain inmates were civilly dead and, 
thus, could not sue at all.127 Other obstacles have become attenuated, 
such as the requirement to demonstrate malice or gross negligence to 
prevail in any suit against prison officials.128 
But it still is often no easy feat for an inmate to pursue a claim of 
medical injury. This is not only because prisoners attempting to sue 
state prison agencies or physicians under these causes of action still face 
a number of obstacles members of the general population typically do 
not face when seeking a legal remedy for a medical injury. Among these 
additional obstacles are sovereign immunity and the concomitant re-
quirement to exhaust administrative remedies, as will be discussed 
below. 
Filing state claims that seek redress for medical injury is also 
difficult because new obstacles have emerged since the 1970s. For ex-
ample, states have followed the federal government and enacted prison 
litigation reform legislation that seeks to curb a perceived excess of 
frivolous inmate suits. Moreover, medical malpractice litigation in gen-
eral has gone through several waves of reform that have aimed at 
curbing what the medical community perceived to be excessive damage 
 
126. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107 (referencing the 1969 Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. 
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Supp. 1976)). The section 
referenced in Estelle was repealed and amended in 1985, effective September 
1, 1985. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021 (2011); 1969 Tex. Gen. 
Laws 874; 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3303, 3322. 
127. Zalman, supra note 10, at 187–88 (discussing New York law in effect circa 
1970 and its judicial attenuation). Currently, “civil death laws . . . impose 
no significant disability on inmates” when it comes to the right to sue and 
be sued. 3 Mushlin, supra note 6, § 16:2. 
128. Sneidman, supra note 10, at 451–53. Sneidman cites an eighteenth-century 
English treatise to the effect that jailers had a duty to avoid the spread of 
contagious diseases and placing prisoners in unhealthy accommodations, so 
they were prevented from behaving “with the least degree of wanton cruelty 
to their prisoners.” Id. at 450–51 (citing William Hawkins, A Treatise of 
the Pleas of the Crown, ch. 31, § 10, at 119 (Thomas Leach ed., 6th ed. 
1788) (1716)). The current constitutional standard for medical injury under 
the Eight Amendment is, in part, “deliberate indifference,” i.e., “subjective 
recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
839–40 (1994). This formulation seems to have grasped the “original meaning” 
of the Eighth Amendment quite well. 
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awards and an avalanche of frivolous suits that allegedly led to an un-
reasonable increase in liability insurance premiums.129 While some have 
lauded and promoted such efforts, others have pointed out that the 
problem underlying the symptom of spiking medical malpractice insur-
ance premiums appears to be largely rooted in economic realities, not 
in excessive lawsuits.130 
But limiting access to the courts to litigate medical torts in 
particular comes at a price in terms of justice and quality assurance: 
Absent viable alternatives in the U.S.,131 such limitations interfere with 
“the primary regulatory vehicle for compensating wrongfully injured 
patients and deterring future medical error.”132 While this sentiment 
was formulated in view of the impact of “tort reform” on the general 
population, it appears particularly apt in view of prisoners and other 
populations with little to no choice when it comes to their medical 
providers. 
These and other difficulties in pursuing state claims may be among 
the factors that have led to a “dearth of state court litigation” of pris-
oners’ medical claims.133 Nonetheless, this Comment will set forth the 
basic elements of tort and medical malpractice claims and shed light on 
some of the challenges inmates face when it comes to litigating their 
medical tort and malpractice claims. It will use published state court 
opinions as guides through this legal landscape. 
B. Distinguishing Tort and Medical Malpractice Claims and 
Establishing the Standard of Care 
A basic decision every plaintiff has to make is which cause of action 
to pursue to obtain appropriate relief for the alleged injury. This is also 
the case for inmates contemplating a suit regarding inadequate medical 
care. Specifically, they may pursue a regular tort claim or a medical 
malpractice claim. Which of these actions to pursue is not left to the 
 
129. Scott DeVito & Andrew W. Jurs, “Doubling-Down” for Defendants: The 
Pernicious Effects of Tort Reform, 118 Penn St. L. Rev. 543, 549–54 
(2014) (outlining the main features of, and rationales behind, the three 
waves of tort reform in the 1970s, 1980s, and 2000s). 
130. Douglas A. Kysar et al., Medical Malpractice Myths and Realities: Why an 
Insurance Crisis Is Not a Lawsuit Crisis, 39 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 785, 787 
(2006) (“[C]areful inquiries into insurance industry dynamics have identified 
insurers’ business practices, rather than malpractice payouts, as the primary 
source of premium volatility.”); see id. at 794–99 (discussing the insurance 
industry dynamics leading to spiking premiums); id. at 800–13 (illuminating 
the “lawsuit crisis”). 
131. Id. at 790–92. 
132. Id. at 794. 
133. 1 Mushlin, supra note 6, § 4:1. 
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plaintiffs’ choice, but is determined by the nature of the claim they wish 
to bring. Ohio law, for example, requires plaintiffs to bring a claim for 
medical malpractice if the claim is asserted against a medical provider 
employed by the state or a hospital and arises out of medical diagnosis, 
care, or treatment.134 This requirement also applies to inmates in state 
prisons.135 
The selection of the proper cause of action leads to a number of 
consequences. For instance, the elements a plaintiff must establish in a 
medical malpractice action136 are different from those in a claim of 
ordinary negligence.137 Moreover, if inmate plaintiffs are required to 
bring a malpractice claim, they must ordinarily provide expert testi-
mony to establish the elements of their claim.138 In fact, state law may 
 
134. Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Med. Application of Ohio, Inc., 905 N.E.2d 635, 637 
(Ohio 2009) (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.113(E)(3) (West 2004)). 
Importantly, both requirements need to be met in each case. For example, a 
claim asserted against a medical provider not engaged in medical diagnosis, 
care, or treatment does not sound in medical malpractice, but in ordinary 
negligence. Franks v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 12AP–442, 2013 
WL 1632101, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2013); Foster v. Dep’t of 
Rehab. & Corr., No. 12AP–503, 2013 WL 988056, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 
12, 2013). On the other hand, a claim of medical malpractice will not lie 
against a non-medical professional, as defined by state law. McKuhen v. 
TransformHealthRX, Inc., 790 S.E.2d 122, 130 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016), 
reconsideration denied (July 28, 2016), cert. denied (Apr. 17, 2017) (holding 
that defendant who was trained as an emergency management technician 
and dispensed medication on the weekend shift was not among medical 
professional listed in Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-9.1(g) (West 2011)); Randall 
v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice Emps., No. 01-97-00649-CV, 1999 WL 
681918, at *6 (Tex. App. Aug. 31, 1999). 
135. E.g., Foy v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., Nos. 16AP–723, 16AP–724, 2017 
WL 1091587, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2017); Johnson v. Ohio Dep’t 
of Rehab. & Corr., No. 06AP–196, 2006 WL 3517998, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 7, 2006) (holding that, because the state agency had not carried its 
burden of showing it was a “hospital” within the meaning of Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 2305.111(E)(1) (West 2004), summary judgment in its favor 
was inappropriate on the theory of medical malpractice). 
136. The standard elements of a medical malpractice action are “(1) the standard 
of care within the medical community; (2) the defendant’s breach of that 
standard of care; and (3) proximate cause between the breach and the 
plaintiff’s injuries.” Foy, 2017 WL 1091587, at *7. 
137. The standard elements of an ordinary negligence claim are “(1) the existence 
of a duty owed to [plaintiff] by the defendant, (2) a breach of that duty, 
and (3) injury proximately resulting from that breach.” Franks, 2013 WL 
1632101, at *5. 
138. “Unless a matter is within the comprehension of a layperson, expert 
testimony is necessary” to establish all three elements. Ramage v. Cent. 
Ohio Emergency Servs., Inc., 592 N.E.2d 828, 833 (Ohio 1992); Foy, 2017 
WL 1091587, at *7 (citing Ramage as applicable in prison context). Accord 
Hertz v. Beach, 211 P.3d 668, 680–81 (Alaska 2009) (requiring expert 
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require that an “affidavit of merit” or similar document by a qualified 
expert witness accompany the complaint, although a failure to provide 
such an affidavit may not cause a dismissal on the merits.139 At the 
summary judgment stage, however, the absence of plaintiff’s medical 
expert testimony will lead to an adverse judgment on the merits, even 
where defendants provided only their personal medical expert testi-
mony.140 
The standard of care in malpractice actions141 is established by 
medical expert testimony.142 The standard for inmates is no different 
 
testimony where the actions required involve “specialized medical care, skill, 
or judgment”); Bryant v. Harrington, F067290, 2014 WL 5392967, at *7 
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2014) (discussing the relationship between summary 
judgement and expert testimony in medical malpractice claims); McKuhen, 
790 S.E.2d at 128–30 (rejecting testimony of expert who did not meet 
statutory qualifications); McCool v. Dep’t of Corr., 984 A.2d 565, 571–72 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (stating that without expert testimony the 
prisoners claim for medical malpractice cannot survive summary 
judgement); Denson v. T.D.C.J.-I.D., No. 12–02–00099–CV, 2003 WL 
21254862, at *20–21 (Tex. Ct. App. May 20, 2003) (holding that a fellow 
inmate could not serve as a medical expert because he, though otherwise 
qualified, was not practicing medicine when the claim arose, as required 
under state law). 
139. E.g., Ohio Civ. R. 10(D)(2)(a), (d). 
140. Montanez v. Questcare, Inc., 675 So. 2d 466, 467 (Ala. 1996). 
141. Since the 1960s, the standard of care has broadened from the “strict locality 
rule” to a national standard. See, e.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency 
Hosp. Ass’n, 349 A.2d 245, 247–54 (Md. 1975) (discussing the development 
of various standards of care in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
nationally and in Maryland for both physicians and hospitals). In fact, the 
“strict locality rule” is itself a physician-sponsored reaction to the very first 
U.S. medical malpractice crisis of the mid-1800s when it displaced the 
reasonableness standard. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Professional Power and the 
Standard of Care in Medicine, 44 Ariz. St. L.J. 1165, 1177, 1180–81 
(2012). The locality rule made it difficult for plaintiffs to secure expert 
witnesses. Id. at 1181. Accord Glen O. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice 
Crisis of the 1970’s: A Retrospective, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 
1986, at 5, 16–17. While there was some reaction to the geographically 
broadened standard from those who sought to implement tort reform via 
restrictive legislation, it was not thorough or widespread during the first 
wave of reform. Id. at 23. 
142. Ramage, 592 N.E.2d at 833. Experts may draw in their testimony on the 
standards promulgated by non-governmental prison accreditation 
organizations such as the American Correctional Association and the 
National Commission on Correctional Health Care. E.g., District of 
Columbia v. Wilson, 721 A.2d 591, 598 (D.C. 1998). But these standards 
do not establish the constitutional standard for healthcare under the Eighth 
Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543 n.27 (1979). 
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than the one for the general population in a particular state.143 However, 
under the reasonable physician standard, constraints typical in the 
prison setting may be considered by the fact finder when determining 
whether the standard of care has been breached.144 
While non-medical defendants are not subject to medical mal-
practice suits, they may be found liable—for instance, under a duty of 
custodial care—in a claim of ordinary negligence.145 Similarly, medical 
staff not engaged in medical care, diagnosis, or treatment may be found 
liable under the general duty of custodial care the state owes its inmates 
in a claim for ordinary negligence.146 An alternative theory of liability—
ministerial neglect—was extended by a New York court to prison staff 
when it found that both medical and non-medical defendants breached 
administrative medical protocols that had been put in place in the wake 
of a federal lawsuit and left them with no discretion in attending to 
plaintiff’s medical needs.147 Additionally, a California court held that a 
 
143. E.g., Jameson v. Desta, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 755, 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); 
District of Columbia v. Mitchell, 533 A.2d 629, 648 (D.C. 1987); Pisacano v. 
State, 188 N.Y.S.2d 35, 40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959); Foy, 2017 WL 1091587, 
at *7; Shea v. City of Spokane, 562 P.2d 264, 270 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977), 
aff’d, 578 P.2d 42 (Wash. 1978). 
144. E.g., Moss v. Miller, 625 N.E.2d 1044, 1051 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing 
that “constraints necessarily exist in correctional institutions which may well 
have a negative effect on the ability to deliver medical services,” such as 
“limitations on direct referrals”); Allen v. Hinchman, 20 N.E.3d 863, 870–71 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that the finder of fact may take security and 
budget concerns facing prison physicians into account under the general 
standard of care articulated in Vergara ex rel. Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E.2d 
185, 187 (Ind. 1992) (abandoning the modified locality rule in favor of “that 
degree of care, skill, and proficiency exercised by reasonably careful, skillful, 
and prudent practitioners in the same class to which he belongs, acting under 
the same or similar circumstances.”). 
145. E.g., Watson v. State, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 262, 265–66 (Ct. App. 1993) (discussing 
the scope of the statutory duty of public entities or public employees to 
summon medical care in case of obvious medical conditions requiring 
immediate care under Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6 (West 2012)); Darling v. 
Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff, 2 So. 3d 368, 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
146. Franks v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 12AP–442, 2013 WL 1632101, 
at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). 
147. Kagan v. State, 646 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (App. Div. 1996). The federal lawsuit 
referenced in Kagan is Todaro v. Ward, 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), 
which involved the same women’s prison, Bedford Hills, in which the plaintiff 
in Kagan was incarcerated. Id. at 1131; see also Howard v. City of Columbus, 
521 S.E.2d 51, 68 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (holding licensed practical nurses 
liable for failure to perform their ministerial duties); infra note 162 and 
accompanying text (discussing the distinction between ministerial and 
discretionary functions in the context of sovereign immunity). 
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prison physician owed the fiduciary duty of obtaining an inmate’s 
informed consent prior to performing a medical procedure.148 
C. Sovereign Immunity 
Historically, governmental entities and their agencies—for example, 
a department of corrections running the state’s prisons or the hospital 
run by a state university—enjoyed complete sovereign immunity from 
suit.149 But over time, this absolute immunity came to be replaced by 
limited immunities that vary from state to state.150 These limited im-
munities are realized either by abolishing immunity altogether and 
carving out certain exceptions from this rule or by maintaining general 
immunity and carving out certain exceptions from that rule.151 And 
while governmental agents in their individual capacity historically were 
liable to suit, they now are afforded a variety of immunities.152 In some 
states, the liability of a governmental entity is tied to whether an indi-
vidual governmental agent is liable.153 
Like the general population, prisoners have to navigate the issues 
raised by sovereign immunity and its partial waivers set forth in state 
tort law if they wish to sue the state for claims related to the provision 
of healthcare. For instance, in several Texas cases, the inmates’ claims 
turned on whether the alleged governmental conduct fell within one of 
the exceptions from sovereign immunity under the Texas Torts Claims 
Act and whether their claims were asserted against the governmental 
unit, not individual government employees.154 Conversely, California 
 
148. Jameson, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 771 (citing Moore v. Regents of Univ. of 
Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990)). “The elements of a cause of action for 
breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach 
of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.” 
Id. (quoting Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 776 (Ct. App. 
1995)). 
149. Dobbs, et al., supra note 121, § 334. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. § 342. 
152. Id. § 334. 
153. Id. § 350. 
154. E.g., Denson v. T.D.C.J.-I.D., No. 12–02–00099–CV, 2003 WL 21254862, at 
*16–17 (Tex. App. 2003) (noting that the Texas Tort Claims Act “does not 
provide for recovery against individuals employed by the state,” and that 
claims against governmental units must fall within one of the “three specific 
areas of liability” set forth in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 
§ 101.021 (West 2011), i.e., employee use of motor-driven vehicle; condition 
or use of tangible personal or real property; premise liability); Roberson v. 
Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, No. 14-99-00493-CV, 2000 WL 
1262525, at *7 (Tex. App. 2000); Randall v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice 
Emps., No. 01-97-00649-CV, 1999 WL 681918, at *6 (Tex. App. 1999). 
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law provides a blanket exception from sovereign immunity for public 
employees “lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts 
under any law of this state.”155 Accordingly, medical malpractice suits 
must be brought against the individual employee, not the agency, while 
general negligence suits may be brought against both the governmental 
agency and the employee.156 
Pennsylvania statutory law provides that sovereign immunity is not 
a defense available to medical professionals employed by the state in 
the prison context.157 Illinois achieves the same result based on its case 
law because state courts inquire about the source of a duty that was 
allegedly breached while the state defendants were acting within the 
scope of their employment to determine whether a state employee en-
joys sovereign immunity.158 Thus, if the duty originated in the employ-
ment relationship with the state, immunity attaches. But if the duty 
originated independently of state employment, immunity does not 
attach.159 This means that state-employed prison medical providers can-
not claim a sovereign-immunity defense if “[t]he duties . . . [they] 
allegedly breached were those every physician owes one’s patient, rather 
than obligations incurred solely by virtue of holding a public office.”160 
At least one Georgia appeals court pursued a similar line of 
reasoning. It held that state-employed prison physicians are not 
shielded by official immunity when functioning as physicians due to the 
professional relationship of trust that exists between patient and 
physician.161 The court so held because the professional relationship 
 
155. Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6 (West 2012). 
156. Watson v. State, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 262, 265 (Ct. App. 1993). See also supra 
note 145 (discussing liability for failure to summon medical care that extends 
to both governmental units and employees under California law). 
157. Williams v. Syed, 782 A.2d 1090, 1095 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (citing 42 
Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8522(b)(2) (West 2017)). Pisacano v. 
State, 188 N.Y.S.2d 35, 41 (App. Div. 1959), held that the broad scope of 
the state’s waiver statute—N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8, as construed in Becker v. 
City of New York, 140 N.E.2d 262, 267 (N.Y. 1957)—even exposed the state 
to vicarious liability for its medical prison employees. See infra Section II.E. 
(discussing the issue of vicarious liability for state medical employees). 
158. Currie v. Lao, 592 N.E.2d 977, 980 (Ill. 1992). 
159. Id. 
160. Moss v. Miller, 625 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993). 
161. See generally Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why Physicians Are Fiduciaries for 
Their Patients, 12 Ind. Health L. Rev. 1 (2015) (discussing the potential 
legal role of trust in the patient-physician relationship, and the importance 
of trust between physicians and patients). Equity courts traditionally 
recognized a fiduciary relationship between physicians and patients. 1 
Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 321 (13th ed. 
1886). 
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effectively creates an exception from immunity.162 The Georgia Supreme 
Court has since eliminated this judge-made exception for medical 
defendants acting within the scope of their government employment.163 
D. Meeting Administrative Requirements 
Related to the concept of sovereign immunity is the requirement 
that those who wish to sue the state as prisoners may have to meet cer-
tain administrative requirements prior to filing a complaint. For 
example, in Texas, a “governmental unit is entitled to receive notice of 
a claim against it” within six months of the complained conduct.164 
Texas prisoners may meet this requirement by filing a grievance with 
the state agency in charge of prisons.165 Specifically, before inmates can 
 
162. Howard v. City of Columbus, 521 S.E.2d 51, 68–69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) 
(citing Keenan v. Plouffe, 482 S.E.2d 253, 255–57 (Ga. 1997), overruled, 
Shekhawat v. Jones, 746 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. 2013)) (granting sovereign immunity 
for LPNs performing discretionary acts and to medical doctor acting as 
county medical director but not to same medical doctor when acting as 
physician due to the latter’s professional relationship of trust to his patients). 
The Keenan court limited its holding to cases where patients choose their 
treating physician; it did not “consider whether immunity is appropriate for 
state-employed physicians who are required to treat particular patients.” 
Keenan, 482 S.E.2d at 257 n.17. Arguably, then, immunity would be 
appropriate for prison physicians even under Keenan. Howard, as well as 
Keenan, also relied on a case involving the medical care of a physician 
employed by a corporation who had alleged immunity from suit based on 
co-employee immunity under Georgia’s Workers’ Compensation Act, Ga. 
Code Ann. § 34-9-11(a) (West 2017). See Davis v. Stover, 366 S.E.2d 670, 
671 (Ga. 1988) (holding that “it is the [defendant’s] professional standing 
that creates a trusting relationship that cannot be breached with impunity,” 
regardless of statutory immunities). On the defense of discretionary acts—
as opposed to ministerial acts—in the context of sovereign immunity raised 
in Howard and Keenan, see Dobbs et al., supra note 121, §§ 344, 350. 
163. Shekhawat, 746 S.E.2d at 93. 
164. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 101.101(a) (West 2011). California inmates 
must also comply with a similar statutory requirement. Cal. Gov’t Code 
§§ 910, 915(b), 945.4, 950.2 (West 2012); Watson v. State, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
262, 266–68 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the variance between plaintiff’s 
required notice filed with state alleging failure to summon medical care and 
his amended complaint alleging failure to provide adequate treatment was 
fatal because these claims are not equivalent under Cal. Gov’t Code 
§ 845.6 (West 2012)); see also State v. Superior Court, 90 P.3d 116, 122 
(Cal. 2004) (discussing the historical background of California’s current 
claim presentation statutes). 
165. E.g., Roberson v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, No. 14-99-00493-
CV, 2000 WL 1262525, at *6–7 (Tex. App. 2000). 
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file a claim, they must exhaust the administrative remedies available 
within the prison system.166 
A number of states have enacted a variety of generally applicable 
pre-trial screening requirements specifically as a response to a perceived 
medical malpractice crisis.167 For instance, as already noted, those al-
leging medical malpractice in Ohio must file “one or more affidavits of 
merit relative to each defendant named in the complaint for whom ex-
pert testimony is necessary to establish liability.”168 These affidavits 
“shall be provided by an expert witness . . . .”169 Accordingly, inmates 
who fail to produce these affidavits cannot prevail in a medical mal-
practice action but may be able to proceed on general-negligence 
grounds.170 Similarly, Delaware law requires all claimants, including 
prisoners, to file an expert affidavit of merit with their medical mal-
practice complaint.171 
Louisiana law provides that medical malpractice claims against the 
state raised by the general population must ordinarily go through a 
“medical review panel procedure” before they become “susceptible of 
judicial recognition or adjudication.”172 Prisoners can satisfy the 
administrative review prerequisite by submitting their malpractice 
claims first to the hearing procedures “in the correctional environment 
or established in accordance with express law.”173 
 
166. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 14.005 (West 2017); Tex. Gov’t Code 
§ 501.008 (West 2012); Brown v. Talley, No. 08-02-00397-CV, 2003 WL 
22283271, at *1 (Tex. App. Oct. 2, 2003). 
167. Robinson, supra note 141, at 25. 
168. Ohio Civ. R. 10(D)(2)(a). 
169. Id. 
170. E.g., Franks v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 958 N.E.2d 1253, 1255–57 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
171. Steedley v. Surdo-Galef, No. 499, 2013 WL 1228019, at *1 (Del. Mar. 26, 
2013) (quoting Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 6853(a) (West 2017)) (holding 
that the affidavit requirement is not unconstitutional as applied to inmates). 
172. La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(E)(1) (2016); see Leonard J. Nelson, III et. al., 
Medical Malpractice Reform in Three Southern States, 4 J. Health & 
Biomed. L. 69, 98–112 (2008) (discussing the broader context of medical 
malpractice reform in Louisiana that included several features in addition to 
medical review panels). Medical review panels were first introduced as part 
of the 1970s medical malpractice reforms in the states. Patricia Munch 
Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice 
Claims 43 (1982) (discussing the prevalence of this procedure in the states 
in 1982); Patricia Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical 
Malpractice Claims, 27 J.L. & Econ. 115, 146–47 (1984) (dating the 
adoption of the panel procedure, “PAN,” across the fifty states). 
173. La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(E)(1) (2016); Walker v. Appurao, 29. So. 3d 
575, 576–77 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
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Similarly, Massachusetts law requires the general population, as 
well as inmates,174 to present their medical malpractice claims to a tri-
bunal consisting of a superior court justice, a licensed physician, and an 
attorney prior to seeking judicial relief.175 Within thirty days of the 
tribunal’s finding, claimants must post a bond of $6,000 that is payable 
to the defendants if the plaintiff does not prevail in the final judg-
ment.176 Upon motion by the claimant, the amount of the bond may be 
decreased for indigent claimants.177 This provision is particularly rele-
vant for prisoners “since most inmate [plaintiffs] are indigent.”178 
 Resisting the usually defendant-friendly trend of malpractice re-
form, Connecticut, in 1998, amended its general statute authorizing ac-
tions against the state to make the filing of medical malpractice actions 
easier. This is particularly relevant for state prisoners because, as seen 
above,179 Connecticut not only houses them, but also, via the state 
university, provides medical care to them. Prior to the change, the State 
Claim’s Commissioner held a trial-like hearing to determine whether to 
allow the claim to go forward.180 After the change, the Commissioner 
was required to allow a medical malpractice suit against the state or 
medical provider employed by the state if the plaintiff submitted a cer-
tificate of good faith.181 For a prisoner who was injured prior to the 
effective date of the statute, the simplified procedure was not available 
 
174. Lanza v. Mohamed, 1995 Mass. App. Div. 53, 53 (Dist. Ct. 1995). 
175. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 2015). 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. 3 Mushlin, supra note 6, § 17:29. 
179. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing how Connecticut provides managed 
healthcare to inmates). 
180. D’Eramo v. Smith, 872 A.2d 408, 416 (Conn. 2005) (discussing a pre-1998 
scenario involving a medical malpractice claim and noting that “the effect of 
the [1998] statute was to convert a limited waiver of sovereign immunity to 
medical malpractice claims . . . to a more expansive waiver subject only to 
the claimant’s compliance with certain procedural requirements.”); see 1998 
Conn. Acts 334 (Reg. Sess.) (containing the session law amending the pre-
1998 statute by inserting the paragraph that is now Conn. Gen. Stat. 
Ann. § 4-160(b) (West Supp. 2017)). 
181. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-160(b). The certificate of good faith is the result of 
“a reasonable inquiry . . . to determine that there are grounds for a good 
faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the 
claimant.” Id. § 52-190a(a). The certificate is to be based on “a written and 
signed opinion of a similar health care provider . . . that there appears to be 
evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation 
of such opinion.” Id. 
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because the state supreme court deemed the change enacted by the leg-
islature to be substantive in nature, not merely procedural.182 
E. Direct and Vicarious Liability of State Agencies for Medical 
Malpractice 
Beginning in the early twentieth century, courts created what is 
called the “corporate practice of medicine doctrine,” which was in-
tended to shield physicians from being controlled in their medical prac-
tice by non-medical, corporate considerations.183 While this was a noble 
sentiment at the time, it also created an effective shield from vicarious 
liability for hospitals. For example, the New York high court held, in a 
1914 opinion written by Justice Cardozo, that a hospital was not 
vicariously liable for the tort of trespass184 committed by a physician 
serving the hospital because the “relation subsisting between a hospital 
and its physicians . . . is not one of master and servant, but the 
physician occupies the position . . . of an independent con-
tractor . . . liable, of course, for his own wrongs.”185 After all, the 
“hospital does not undertake to act through them, but merely to pro-
cure them to act upon their own responsibility.”186 Thus, under this 
theory, a hospital could be held liable for the conduct of the physicians 
it “procured” for patients only directly, meaning, for instance, if the 
hospital itself had also acted negligently when hiring the negligent 
physician.187 
This theory, abrogated in 1957, became known in New York as the 
“Schloendorff rule” and barred vicarious liability of any hospital em-
 
182. D’Eramo, 872 A.2d at 416–18. 
183. Huberfeld, supra note 52, at 251–53. 
184. “In early common law, battery claims were pursued by an action for trespass 
to the person and thus fell under the rule that trespass actions would lie 
only if the harm was done directly.” Dobbs et al., supra note 121, § 33. 
185. Schloendorff v. Soc’y. of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). The 
court’s primary rationale for hospital immunity in this particular case was 
that the hospital was a charitable corporation. Id.; see Ballerini, supra note 
121, at 321–25 (discussing the rise and fall of charitable hospital immunity 
from vicarious liability). 
186. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 94. 
187. Id. (quoting Glavin v. R.I. Hosp., 12 R.I. 411, 424 (1879)). In Glavin, the court 
also stated: “A patient has a right to rely on the exercise of such [reasonable] 
care” in selecting physicians “skillful and trustworthy in their professions,” 
“and consequently if, through the neglect of the hospital to exercise it, he 
receives an injury, he is entitled to look to the hospital for indemnity . . . .” 
Glavin, 12 R.I. at 424. Accord McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 
436 (1876) (holding that corporations must use reasonable care when selecting 
its agents). But see Ballerini, supra note 121, at 328 (claiming that hospitals 
became liable for negligent hiring first in the 1960s). 
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ploying medical providers.188 However, this rule was held inapplicable 
in medical claims against the state based on negligent conduct of state 
employees because the state’s sovereign immunity legislation put state 
institutions beyond the scope of the rule.189 
But this does not mean that hospitals are always liable for the 
negligent conduct of all medical staff working in the hospital. While 
negligent conduct of hospital employees could lead to vicarious liability 
of the hospital, negligent conduct of independent contractors is not 
necessarily attributable to the hospital.190 In New York, a critical 
element here is that of “control in respect to the manner in which the 
work is to be done.”191 In other words, considering “the actualities” of 
the employment relationship, not simply the contractual designation of 
a member of the hospital staff,192 the hospital will be found vicariously 
liable for the negligent conduct even of an “independent contractor,” if 
the contractor was required to treat patients according to the hospital’s 
rules and regulations.193 
In addition to the “agency or control in fact” just described as a 
basis for vicarious liability, a hospital or corporation can be held vicar-
iously liable in a malpractice action based on “apparent or ostensible 
agency.”194 Under this theory, vicarious liability would attach where the 
hospital or corporation held out a medical provider as its agent, creating 
reliance on this representation in the patient who contracts with the 
medical provider.195 
 
188. Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 3, 7 (N.Y. 1957). 
189. Becker v. City of New York, 140 N.E.2d 262, 268 (N.Y. 1957) (citing N.Y. 
Ct. Cl. Act § 8). 
190. See generally Dobbs et al., supra note 121, §§ 425, 431. 
191. Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (App. Div. 1976) (citing 
In re Susan Messer Assoc., 306 N.Y.S.2d 842, 842 (App. Div. 1970)). 
192. Id. (citing In re Fidel Ass’n of N.Y., 259 A.D. 486, 487 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1940)). 
193. Id. at 453. 
194. Hill v. St. Clare’s Hosp., 490 N.E.2d 823, 827 (N.Y. 1986). 
195. Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 60 N.E. 597, 597–98 (N.Y. 1901) (holding a 
department store liable for malpractice of a dentist owning a dentistry clinic 
in the store where the injured patient had relied on the store’s representation 
that the store was running a dentistry business although it was prohibited 
to do so under state law). Accord Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 
(Am. Law Inst. 2003); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm § 65(a) (Am. Law Inst. 2012); see also 
Dobbs et al., supra note 121, § 433 (noting that a plaintiff’s “reliance” can 
be replaced by plaintiff’s “reasonable belief”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017 
Medicine Behind Bars 
639 
These rules also apply to New York state prison agencies employing 
or contracting with medical providers.196 Accordingly, under the theory 
of “ostensible agency,” the state would be vicariously liable for medical 
malpractice if, for instance, “the plaintiff could have reasonably 
believed, based upon all of the surrounding circumstances, that the 
treating physician was provided by the defendant . . . or was otherwise 
acting on the defendant’s behalf.”197 Especially important are the state’s 
own words or conduct “that give rise to the appearance and belief that 
the doctors were acting on its behalf.”198 
Other states operate with similar distinctions, in part as an 
extension of sovereign immunity. For example, the Texas Court of 
Appeals held that a county was not vicariously liable for the negligent 
conduct of physicians employed by the state university but working for 
the county as independent contractors over which the county had “no 
right to control.”199 This was because the state law waiving sovereign 
immunity for certain state employees’ negligent conduct expressly 
excepted independent contractors and their agents not legally con-
trolled by the state.200 The court agreed with the plaintiff that the 
county, under state law, had a “nondelegable duty to provide adequate 
health care . . . to its inmates,”201 but found that the county had 
“discharged that duty by entering into a contract with a reputable 
health care provider.”202 And because the agreement between the county 
and the provider set only very broad parameters for medical care, the 
court held that the county did not sufficiently control their independent 
contractors to bring the county into the scope of the state law’s waiver 
of sovereign immunity.203 In fact, the court noted that “the very nature 
of practicing medicine makes it impossible for Harris County” to 
“control[] the details of the physicians’ work.”204 
The doctrine of nondelegable duties also featured prominently in a 
prison healthcare case before the high court of the District of 
 
196. Garofolo v. State, 23 N.Y.S.3d 667, 669 (App. Div. 2016). 
197. Id. (quoting Soltis v. State, 568 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (App. Div. 1991)). 
198. Id. (citing Hallock v. State, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 231 (1984)). 
199. Thomas v. Harris Cty., 30 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Tex. App. 2000). 
200. Id. at 53 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021 (West 
1997)). 
201. Id. at 54 (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 16.21 (West 1997)). 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Columbia.205 One of the court’s panels held that the District of 
Columbia owed a nondelegable duty to provide non-negligent medical 
care to its inmates both under the U.S. Constitution206 and the laws of 
the District.207 As a corollary, the court held that the employees of the 
contractor were, in fact, agents of the state for purposes of vicarious 
liability.208 The court also recognized a direct basis for liability that 
required the plaintiff to establish by expert testimony that the District’s 
supervision of the medical provider was negligent.209 
The rehearing of the case en banc focused solely on the question of 
the District’s nondelegable duty under District law.210 The full court 
reversed the panel’s holding on this issue.211 The full court held that, 
while the District had a nondelegable duty to provide medical care 
under the Eighth Amendment, it did not have such a duty under the 
District’s common law and statutory obligations to provide medical 
care to its inmates.212 
Two Supreme Court decisions caused the full court to arrive at this 
split characterization of the District’s duty. For the constitutional 
question, the court referenced West v. Atkins.213 In West, the Court es-
tablished that the Eighth-Amendment duty to provide adequate 
medical care cannot be contracted away.214 For the common-law and 
 
205. Herbert v. District of Columbia (Herbert I), 691 A.2d 1175 (D.C.), reh’g en 
banc granted, judgment vacated, 698 A.2d 1017 (D.C. 1997), opinion 
reinstated in part on reh’g, 716 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1998). 
206. Id. at 1180 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (noting that 
a violation of the nondelegable duty to provide adequate medical care under 
the Eighth Amendment requires a showing of more than mere negligence or 
medical malpractice, i.e., a showing of “deliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs of prisoners”). 
207. Id. at 1182–83. 
208. Id. at 1183 (citing Medley v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 412 S.E.2d 654, 659 (N.C. 
1992)). 
209. Id. at 1184. Following the leading case, Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l 
Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), liability for negligent supervision is part of 
the institution’s own corporate liability for its own negligent acts. Dobbs et 
al., supra note 121, § 316 (citations omitted) (stating that under the doctrine 
of corporate liability a hospital may be held liable for its own failure to 
supervise its medical staff). The older cases, cited supra note 187, already 
recognized a hospital’s direct liability for negligent hiring. 
210. Herbert v. District of Columbia (Herbert II), 716 A.2d 196, 197 (D.C. 1998). 
211. Id. at 200–01. 
212. Id. 
213. 487 U.S. 42 (1998). 
214. Herbert II, 716 A.2d at 200 (quoting West, 487 U.S. at 56 (1988)). 
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statutory question, the court cited Logue v. United States.215 In Logue, 
the Court declined to impose a nondelegable duty to provide adequate 
medical care on the Federal Bureau of Prisons because the same 1948 
public law that imposed on the Bureau the duty to provide “care” for 
its inmates also authorized the government to contract with the states 
and its subdivisions for such “care.”216 
One of the cases the District’s high court had relied on in its panel 
decision finding a nondelegable duty,217 but which it declined to find 
persuasive in its en banc decision,218 was the North Carolina Supreme 
Court case Medley v. North Carolina Department of Correction.219 
Medley also involved negligent conduct by independent medical 
contractors but came to a result opposite from that reached by the 
Texas Court of Appeals and the District of Columbia high court.220 
This was in part because North Carolina law—unlike Texas law221—
did not expressly exclude independent contractors from the state’s 
waiver of sovereign immunity. And unlike District of Columbia law,222 
it referenced the general principle of agency.223 Additionally, the North 
 
215. 412 U.S. 521 (1973). 
216. Herbert II, 716 A.2d at 199 (quoting Logue, 412 U.S. at 531–32). The federal 
statutes at issue in Logue were 18 U.S.C. §§ 4002, 4042 (2012)). Logue, 412 
U.S. at 528–29. Both sections were enacted as part of an act revising and 
codifying title 18 of the U.S. Code. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-
772, §§ 4002, 4042, 62 Stat. 683, 847, 849. Evidently, a nondelegable duty is 
not the same as a nondelegable task. Rather, the former presupposes 
delegation of the task to non-employees, but disallows delegation of liability 
for non-employee conduct in certain circumstances. 5 Fowler V. Harper 
et al., Harper, James and Gray On Torts § 26.11, at 101 (3d ed. 2006) 
(“In all these cases [where courts found a nondelegable duty] the employer 
is as liable for the conduct of the contractor as though it were his own.”). 
This is why the District of Columbia high court ultimately declined to apply 
the nondelegable-duty doctrine in the Herbert case beyond the context of the 
limited requirements imposed by the Eighth Amendment. Herbert II, 716 
A.2d at 200–01. 
217. Herbert v. District of Columbia (Herbert I), 691 A.2d 1175, 1181–82 (D.C.), 
reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 698 A.2d 1017 (D.C. 1997), 
opinion reinstated in part on reh’g, 716 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1998). 
218. Herbert II, 716 A.2d at 201 n.7 (referencing the opinion-writer’s dissent in 
Herbert I). 
219. 412 S.E.2d 654 (N.C. 1992). 
220. Id. at 659. 
221. Thomas v. Harris Cty., 30 S.W.3d 51, 53 (Tex. App. 2000) (citing Tex. 
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021 (2017)). 
222. As the Herbert I court noted, the District of Columbia did not have a tort 
claims act. Herbert I, 691 A.2d at 1182. 
223. Medley, 412 S.E.2d at 657 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291(a) (2017)). 
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Carolina high court also seemed to have a better understanding than 
the Texas appellate court of what the concept of nondelegable duty 
means for liability purposes. After all, when a nondelegable duty is 
recognized, this means that the duty—and the resultant liability in case 
of a breach of that duty—cannot be contracted away.224 Thus, the 
North Carolina court found that the state’s nondelegable duty to 
provide adequate medical care—established primarily by the state’s 
statutory and decisional law225—turned an independent medical pro-
vider into an agent of the state within the meaning of North Carolina’s 
State Tort Claims Act and resulted in the Department of Correction’s 
vicarious liability for the negligent conduct of that contract physician.226 
Similarly, the Washington Court of Appeals, in Shea v. City of 
Spokane,227 held that a city’s duty to provide healthcare for its prisoners 
was nondelegable so that the city “cannot be relieved of liability for the 
negligent exercise of that duty by delegating it to an ‘independent 
contractor’ physician.”228 
 
224. Id. at 657−58; see also Hardaker v. Idle Dist. Council (1896), 1 Q.B. 335, 
340 (distinguishing a district council’s inevitable liability for a nondelegable 
duty negligently performed by a contractor from the contractor’s collateral 
negligence for which the council is not liable); Dobbs et al., supra note 
121, § 432 (defining “collateral negligence” as a “risk that is not a usual or 
inherent part of the work” contracted for). 
225. Medley, 412 S.E.2d at 657−58 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-19(a) (2017), 
amended by Act of June 29, 2017, N.C. Laws S.L. 2017-186); Spicer v. 
Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926)). 
226. Id. at 659. The Medley court—in support of its holding that the state had a 
nondelegable duty to provide adequate medical care to its inmates—also noted 
that the U.S. Supreme Court held that states cannot avoid their duty to 
provide adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment by contracting 
out medical care. Id. at 658−59 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988)). 
Medley responded to the objection that, under the Eighth Amendment, mere 
negligence is not sufficient to support liability by reasoning that “[t]he United 
States Supreme Court seems to interpret the Eighth Amendment to impose 
on states a broad duty—to provide ‘adequate medical care’ to inmates—while 
at the same time allowing actions under section 1983 only for deliberate 
breaches of that duty.” Id. at 659. Outside the context of nondelegable duty, 
the U.S. Supreme Court, highlighting the importance of “control” discussed 
above, has held that government contractors, if acting within reasonably 
precise specifications supplied by the government, share in the government’s 
immunity. Dobbs et al., supra note 121, § 352 (discussing Boyle v. United 
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 501 (1988)). 
227. 562 P.2d 264 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977), aff’d, 578 P.2d 42 (Wash. 1978).  
228. Id. at 268. The Herbert case also relied on and distinguished Shea. See supra 
notes 205–216 and accompanying text. 
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F. Remedies 
Following the adoption of the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 (“PLRA”),229 a number of states adopted similar, at times 
virtually identical, provisions on remedies.230 In addition to setting forth 
which remedies are available to inmate litigants, these laws require that 
any compensatory damages an inmate might win must first be applied 
to satisfy a variety of the inmate’s obligations, such as court-ordered 
payments including victim’s compensation and child support.231 
 
229. Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
The PLRA was enacted to stem a perceived tide of frivolous inmate 
litigation. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 
1633–34 (2003) (quoting, among others, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524–
25 (2002)); see also Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and 
Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 64 (1997) (noting 
that, by the mid-1990s, “conservatives won the battle of sound bites: law 
suits focusing on peanut butter sandwiches and premium cable became the 
central images [in the prison litigation reform debate] rather than lawsuits 
that attempted to keep cells free of raw sewage”). Tushnet and Yackle also 
shed light on the political dynamics that, beginning in the 1980s on the state 
and federal levels, resulted in the adoption of the PLRA in the mid-1990s. 
Id. at 12–22. 
230. Like their federal counterpart, state PLRAs are broader than the portions 
on remedies discussed here. They also include, e.g., administrative 
exhaustion requirements. See supra Part II.D. The administrative 
exhaustion requirement in the federal PLRA has been called that law’s “most 
damaging component.” Schlanger, supra note 229, at 1650. The states 
adopted their versions of the PLRA to stem an anticipated flow of prisoner 
suits from federal to state courts. Id. at 1635; see also Gibson v. Tolbert, 102 
S.W.3d 710, 713 (Tex. 2003) (noting that the Texas PLRA was enacted “to 
curb this particular area of litigation excess”). 
231. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-29-601 (West 2014) (providing that 
compensatory damages awarded to prisoner in suit against correctional 
facilities, after attorney’s fees and costs, will be applied to satisfy outstanding 
restitution orders); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1182, 15:1189 (2015) (discussing 
available remedies; damage awards and pending restitution orders); MD. 
CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-1006(a)(1), (b) (West 2011) (providing 
that compensatory or punitive damages awarded to inmate in civil action 
“shall be paid directly to satisfy any outstanding judgment of restitution or 
child support order pending against the prisoner” and that the prisoner’s 
custodian is to notify inmate’s victims and child support recipient when such 
damages are awarded); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5511(2)–(3), .5517–
.5527 (West 2013) (discussing damage awards in relation to restitution orders 
and victim notification as well as the conditions and scope of prospective 
relief); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 506.387–.390 (West 2003) (discussing monetary 
damage awards in relation to inmate’s cost of incarceration, outstanding 
court orders regarding victim compensation, restitution, costs, bail, etc., and 
requiring attorney general to send notice to victim of crime regarding 
pending payment of compensatory damages); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-16.4 
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State-law litigants already face the prospect of rather meager 
damage awards because their loss of income and medical expenses in 
case of an injury caused by simple negligence or medical malpractice 
are typically not very significant. This is because inmates do not have 
any significant income while incarcerated232 and their medical expenses, 
at least while in prison, are covered by the state.233 Unlike in the case 
of civil-rights violations brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, general or 
presumed damages are not available to supplement damage awards in 
these actions, except in cases of intentional torts such as assault and 
battery.234 Moreover, some state PLRAs—like their federal counter-
part235—provide for limitations on attorney fees recoverable by inmate 
litigants.236 Considering these factors, even inmates with a meritorious 
 
(West 2008) (mandating use of money judgments for inmates to satisfy 
outstanding court-ordered obligations or claims for reimbursement of medical 
costs); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2969.27 (West 2006) (providing for 
deductions from any judgment for damages awarded to inmates in civil 
action against government entity or employee); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. §§ 6604–6608 (West 2017) (discussing conditions and scope of 
prospective relief and the disbursement conditions of monetary damages 
awarded to inmates); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 25-1A-7 (West 2002) 
(mandating that compensatory damages awarded to inmate must be used 
first to satisfy outstanding court-ordered payments such as restitution or 
child support). 
232. Prison pay rates vary widely depending on the state and the type or time of 
labor an inmate performs: Some states pay nothing (e.g., Arkansas and 
Georgia). A pay of more than $2 per hour is high and only offered for select 
assignments by a few states, e.g., North Carolina and Washington. State and 
Federal Prison Wage Policies and Sourcing Information, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/wage_ 
policies.html [https://perma.cc/RZ9E-SR5P]. 
233. See Schlanger, supra note 229, at 1622 (noting that, given that low to no 
wages and state-paid medical expenses form the basis of damage awards for 
inmates, “it is simply not surprising that damages are low even in cases 
involving very serious injury”). While Schlanger’s article discussed the data 
for federal litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, her data are also representative 
for state-law litigants because the Supreme Court, in Smith v. Wade, 461 
U.S. 30, 34 (1983), has construed remedies for constitutional violations in 
analogy to those for common-law torts. 
234. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 121, §§ 47, 479. 
235. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2012). The background, impact, and constitutionality 
of this provision is discussed in greater detail in Karen M. Klotz, Comment, 
The Price of Civil Rights: The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Attorney’s 
Fee-Cap Provision as a Violation of Equal Protection of the Laws, 73 TEMP. 
L. REV. 759 (2000). 
236. E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1185 (2015) (mirroring the federal limitations); 
W.VA. CODE ANN. § 25-1A-8 (West 2002) (mirroring the federal limitations 
except for the 25 percent/150 percent provisions). 
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malpractice claim will likely not be able to find an attorney to represent 
them and an expert to provide the expertise that is often required sim-
ply to get into court. 
Courts at times have discretion to appoint representation for 
indigent litigants in a civil case, including a malpractice action.237 But 
they may be dissuaded from doing so based on the analogue of a mal-
practice action in the general population where lawyers routinely 
represent indigent clients on a contingency basis.238 Yet because an in-
mate’s compensable injury is small compared to a typical tort suit 
brought by a non-inmate,239 this analogue is highly questionable to the 
point of being cynical. 
Conclusion 
A. Summary of Findings 
As seen in Part I, states regulate the provision of medical care in a 
number of way. While some legislatures provide little to no guidance to 
the state agencies in charge of their prison populations, others provide 
more direction, e.g., by setting forth fundamental parameters involving 
the principles of managed care. While managed care has the potential 
of providing financially stressed state prison systems more affordable 
care for their inmates without sacrificing the quality of care, it also has 
the potential to lead to too little care too late when the goal of cost 
savings is not properly balanced with that of providing medically 
necessary care. 
Federal courts, in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, have 
rejected a “cost defense” advanced by states to defend in medical care 
suits brought by inmates under the Eighth Amendment. Thus, 
managed care plans that are too fiscally ambitious should be well within 
the scope of this jurisprudence. But some states have built a “cost 
defense” into their standard of care. At the same time, other states have 
been implementing a variety of measures seeking to tame managed care 
by balancing the containment of costs and the provision of adequate 
medical care for the general population, for instance by prohibiting 
 
237. E.g., Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 24.016 (West 2004). 
238. E.g., Gibson v. Tolbert, 102 S.W.3d 710, 713 (Tex. 2003) (“[P]laintiffs in 
medical malpractice cases are routinely represented by counsel on contingent 
fee contracts. As long as his claims against Gibson were meritorious, [the 
inmate’s] indigency should not have prevented him from employing able 
counsel.”). 
239. In 1993, state tort trials resulted in a mean verdict of about $430,000 for 
non-inmate litigants, while inmates who prevailed in trials realized a mean 
verdict of $18,800. Schlanger, supra note 229, 1603. In 2012, inmates won a 
mean award of just under $22,000. Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner 
Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 153, 167 
(2015). 
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financial incentives for physicians outright or requiring their disclosure 
to patients. 
As seen in Part II, state tort and malpractice law has changed over 
the past four decades. But this change has not been an unequivocally 
positive one from the prisoner’s perspective. First, litigating medical 
claims now is at least as cumbersome for inmates as it is for the general 
population. This is due to several waves of “tort reform” that have 
sought to fix the problem of costly malpractice insurance by limiting 
plaintiffs’ access to the courts. Moreover, compared to damages 
recoverable by the general population, inmate damages are typically 
quite low, even where the physical injury suffered is the same. This 
reduces the likelihood that inmates will be able to afford competent 
legal representation and the necessary medical experts. 
Second, some states have added a layer of litigation disincentives 
aimed at inmate plaintiffs by enacting statutes that in one way or 
another echo the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These 
two obstacles that limit access to the courts are troublesome because 
access to litigation has—for better or worse—proved to be the most 
effective way to enforce standards of medical care in the U.S. 
B. Proposals for Reform 
“Criminals are not popular. No politician in recent memory has lost 
an election for being too tough on crime.”240 This dual reality seems to 
make meaningful reform in this area difficult to achieve. Still, the 
discussion above has indicated a number of possible areas of reform. In 
fact, the time to raise such proposals seems favorable, as there is, at 
least on the state level, an emerging bipartisan consensus that incar-
cerating more people for longer periods of time is not sustainable.241 
First, state legislatures should revisit the issue of prison litigation 
reform. States now have at least two decades worth of experience with 
attempts to roll back inmate access to the courts in the form of prison 
litigation reform legislation. A candid assessment of what such leg-
islation has accomplished is needed as the foundation for such an assess-
ment. Evidently, the citizens of the states, through their elected repre-
sentatives, must make the final decisions here that balance costs and 
benefits. 
Importantly, there is evidence showing that providing quality medi-
cal care to inmates while they are in prison and connecting them with 
medical care after their release is good public policy also in that it 
actually saves money by keeping ex-inmates out of prison. Giving in-
 
240. Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 229, at 1. 
241. Lorelei Laird, States Featuring Bipartisan Support Rally for Criminal Justice 
Reform, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/ 
article/criminal_justice_reform_louisiana_alaska [https://perma.cc/M5E 
A-527K]. 
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mates more liberal access to the courts when it comes to litigating 
medical claims can play an important role when it comes to improving 
the medical care they receive. 
Second, states that seek to realize cost savings by implementing 
principles of managed care in their prisons should enact measures that 
limit financial incentives for providers also for that particular group of 
their populations the law has placed under their special care, their pris-
oners. In a way, adopting such measures should prove easier for the 
inmate population than for the general population because the typical 
managed care plan for the general population is offered through employ-
ment and, thus, often removed from state action by ERISA preemption. 
This preemption provides no obstacle for regulating managed care plans 
implemented to facilitate affordable care among prisoners. 
Once again, states should realize that they have an interest in 
providing quality medical care to their inmates in that sick inmates, 
once released, often reoffend because they are sick or in order to avail 
themselves of healthcare. In other words, working in prison to release 
prisoners who are healthy and connected to needed medical care in their 
communities should actually save states money. 
Third, states have an understandable interest in shielding them-
selves and their medical employees and contractors from claims of vicar-
ious or direct liability. And they also have a legitimate interest in re-
quiring administrative procedures of claim resolution before allowing 
access to the courts. At the same time, states also have a duty to pro-
vide for their inmate populations’ medical needs. 
Several states—by statutory or decisional law—exempt physicians 
from liability protections and immunities available to other state em-
ployees or contractors. By doing so, these states recognize that the 
patient-physician relationship is different from—and primary to—a 
citizen’s relationship to the government in general and a prisoner’s 
relationship to the remaining prison staff in particular. Equally note-
worthy are those states that recognize that they have a nondelegable 
duty to care for their inmates, even if they employ private contractors 
to provide the medical care. 
Removing medical professionals from the shield of immunities and 
liability protections as well as recognizing a nondelegable duty are com-
mendable because these measures hold the promise of justice and 
accountability. They are, in the limited area of prison medical care, 
meaningful reforms of a “tort reform” that appears to have brought less 
justice and accountability. States should have an interest in exposing 
themselves and their medical employees and contractors to this whole-
some risk to fulfill the duty of care they have in relation to their 
prisoners. 
Fourth, the ACA remains under siege. The House of Repre-
sentatives’ suit relating to certain reimbursements is merely held in 
abeyance. The ACA’s “individual mandate” has been rescinded by 
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Congress. These two measures put the Medicaid expansion in jeopardy. 
States have an interest in keeping this expansion in place, also because 
it allows them to offer basic medical insurance to more inmates and 
more former inmates. As noted earlier, ex-inmates that are provided a 
range of medical services are less likely to reoffend, thereby saving the 
states scarce financial resources. 
Fifth, students of the American healthcare system, who have com-
pared it with the way healthcare is provided in comparable countries 
abroad, have identified an important reason as to why healthcare is 
more costly here than there. And that is that, e.g., European countries 
provide other social welfare programs in addition to healthcare, so that 
not every social issue finds its way into the healthcare system, thereby 
raising the amount of money spent on healthcare.242 And while residents 
of European countries may pay more in social security taxes—including 
payments for healthcare—their American counterparts may actually 
end up paying more for healthcare without getting better healthcare in 
return.243 
This observation is relevant for the discussion of the burgeoning 
costs of providing medical care for inmates. Here, too, one cause of 
increased healthcare spending in prisons appears to be that the 
provision of healthcare and other social services is forced onto the 
institutions that by law must provide them, i.e., jails and prisons. 
Instead of addressing the social and medical causes of criminality and 
recidivism proactively, society seems to have opted for ignoring those 
causes and now lets the prisons “handle” the fallout. But given that, as 
stated above, prisoners are not popular and politicians are not voted 
out of office for sending too many people to prison, this strategy can 
easily result in chronic underfunding for inmate healthcare. 
Moreover, the way society accounts for those prevention programs 
is often in the same way it does in the general healthcare field, i.e., by 
adding, not by subtracting.244 This is to say, the savings that are 
realized by engaging in preventive measures—both in view of crime and 
disease—are never highlighted. What remains are the costs of 
prevention that are added to the costs of incarceration. States should 
take note of this reality and invest more in meaningful preventive 
measures to save more on remedial measures—including incarcer-
ation—that are often socially disruptive. 
 
242. McLean & Richards, supra note 116, at 327. 
243. Id. 
244. “Interestingly, when society does benefit from providing medical treatment 
for social conditions, the avoidance of future medical treatment, and hence 
costs, is never contemplated. Any benefits to society in rehabilitating drunks 
or drug addicts are not subtracted from the medical budget, so the net 
result is always more costs with no credit for the benefits.” Id. at 294. 
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The last proposal goes beyond the scope of this Comment in that 
it points to the societal context of medicine behind bars. It is nonethe-
less important to raise it, lest the discussion of prison healthcare misses 
the forest for the trees. 
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